CEO Contractual Protection and Managerial Short-Termism by CHEN, Xia et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Accountancy School of Accountancy
9-2015
CEO Contractual Protection and Managerial
Short-Termism
Xia CHEN
Singapore Management University, xchen@smu.edu.sg
Qiang CHENG
Singapore Management University, qcheng@smu.edu.sg
Alvis K. LO
Boston College
Xin WANG
University of Hong Kong
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51033
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research
Part of the Accounting Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, and the Human Resources
Management Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
CHEN, Xia; CHENG, Qiang; LO, Alvis K.; and WANG, Xin. CEO Contractual Protection and Managerial Short-Termism. (2015).
Accounting Review. 90, (5), 1871-1906. Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1378
    
 
Singapore Management University 
School of Accountancy Research Paper Series Vol. 2, No. 2 
(Paper No: 2014-18) 
 
 
CEO Contractual Protection and Managerial Short-
Termism 
  
 
 
Xia Chen 
Qiang Cheng 
Alvis K. Lo 
Xin Wang  
 
  
 
 
 
CEO contractual protection and managerial short-termism 
  
 
Xia Chen 
Singapore Management University 
 
Qiang Cheng  
Singapore Management University 
 
Alvis K. Lo 
Boston College 
 
Xin Wang 
The University of Hong Kong 
 
 
March 2014 
 
Abstract 
 
How to address managerial short-termism has been an important issue for companies, regulators, 
and researchers. In this paper we examine the impact of CEO contractual protection, in the form 
of employment agreements and severance pay agreements, on managerial short-termism. We 
find that firms with CEO contractual protection are less likely to cut R&D expenditures to avoid 
earnings decreases and are less likely to engage in real earnings management. The effect of CEO 
contractual protection is both statistically and economically significant. We further find that this 
effect increases with the duration and monetary strength of CEO contractual protection. The 
cross-sectional analyses indicate that this effect is stronger for firms in more homogeneous 
industries and for firms with higher transient institutional ownership, where the protection is 
particularly important for CEOs, and is stronger when there are weaker alternative monitoring 
mechanisms.  
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1. Introduction 
Managerial short-termism, or managerial myopia, has attracted increasing attention from 
researchers and practitioners in the last couple of decades. Managerial short-termism refers to 
cutting long-term investments, such as research and development, in order to meet or beat short-
term performance targets (Porter 1992). Prior studies have studied extensively whether and how 
managerial short-termism can be alleviated by enhancing monitoring or by granting stock-based 
compensation to managers (e.g., Bushee 1998; Cheng 2004; Farber 2005).1 However, the role of 
CEO employment contract (other than CEO compensation structure) in influencing managerial 
myopia has not been explored, despite the prevalence of CEO employment contract and its 
importance in affecting managerial behavior. 
In this paper, we investigate whether CEO employment contract can affect managers’ 
incentives to engage in myopic behavior and hence influence the extent of managerial short-
termism. The fundamental driver of managerial short-termism is the pressure on managers to 
deliver short-term performance.2 CEO employment contract can ease such pressure by protecting 
CEOs from short-term performance swing and downside risk (Rau and Xu 2013). We focus on 
two types of CEO employment contract that can provide such protection to CEOs: CEO 
employment agreements and standalone ex-ante severance pay agreements. We refer to firms 
with such CEO employment contracts as firms with CEO contractual protection. CEO 
employment agreements are fixed-term comprehensive contracts between CEOs and firms; they 
generally specify termination pays as well as other terms such as non-competition and 
                                                 
1 Overall, there is mixed evidence on whether equity incentives help alleviate managerial short-termism. While 
earlier studies find that CEO equity incentives reduce managerial myopia (e.g., Dechow and Sloan 1991; Cheng 
2004), later studies provide mixed evidence and some even suggest that equity incentives can induce myopic 
behavior (e.g., Cheng and Warfield 2005; Efendi et al. 2007; Erickson et al. 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006). 
2 See, for examples, DeFond and Park (1997) on the pressure related to job security, Matsunaga and Park (2001) and 
Comprix and Muller III (2006) on the pressure related to executive compensation, Stein (1988) on the takeover 
pressure, and Stein (1989) and Bhojraj and Libby (2005) on the capital market pressure to deliver short-term 
performance.  
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confidentiality. CEOs with employment agreements cannot be fired within the term without good 
cause. Standalone severance pay agreements stipulate the amount and terms of payments 
executives can receive when their employment is terminated. Both employment agreements and 
standalone severance pay agreements offer protection to CEOs by increasing the cost of 
termination to the firm and by providing CEOs with compensation for termination and downside 
risk (Rusticus 2006; Xu 2010).3 As a result, we predict that CEOs with contractual protection are 
under lower pressure to maintain high short-term performance and are thus less likely to engage 
in myopic behavior compared to those without contractual protection.  
We test this prediction using S&P 500 firms with required data over the period 1995-2008. 
We hand collect CEO employment agreement and severance pay agreement information from 
proxy statements. Following prior research (e.g., Bushee 1998), in the main analyses we capture 
managerial short-termism using the likelihood of cutting R&D expenditures when the firm faces 
a potential earnings decrease that can be averted by cutting R&D. We choose this proxy because 
the tradeoff between meeting current earnings targets and increasing long-term firm performance 
is particularly salient in the case of cutting R&D (e.g., Graham et al. 2005). Specifically, we 
select a set of firms with pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings that are below the prior year’s level, but by 
an amount that is smaller than the prior year’s R&D. We refer to these firms as the small 
earnings decrease (SD) group, our test group. Since managers of these firms have incentives to 
cut R&D to meet earnings targets, we predict that within the SD group, CEO contractual 
protection is negatively associated with the likelihood of cutting R&D. Given that the existence 
                                                 
3 While executives with an employment agreement or a severance pay agreement will not receive termination 
payments if they are fired with good cause, good cause usually does not include CEO incompetence or poor firm 
performance. That is, CEOs fired because of poor performance will be able to receive termination or severance 
payments. For example, in April 2011, Six Flags paid out $30 million to the former Chief Financial Officer Jeffrey 
Speed in an arbitration case. Speed won the ruling by arguing that his dismissal without good cause violated his 
employment agreement with Six Flags (Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2011). 
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of CEO contractual protection varies with firm and CEO characteristics (e.g., Gillan et al. 2009; 
Rau and Xu 2013), we control for the endogeneity issue using both the instrument variable 
approach and the Heckman approach (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004). We find that, consistent with our 
prediction, within the SD group, firms with CEO contractual protection are significantly less 
likely to cut R&D expenditures than those without such protection. The estimated difference 
ranges from 20.4 to 24.6 percentage points, depending on the model specifications. This 
difference is economically significant given that about half of the firms in the SD group cut R&D 
expenditures.  
Unlike for the SD group, for the other firm-years, managers do not have the incentives to 
cut R&D to meet short-term earnings targets, either because cutting R&D cannot help firms 
avoid earnings decreases (when firms have large earnings decreases) or because cutting R&D is 
unnecessary (when firms have earnings increases). As such, we expect that CEO contractual 
protection does not affect the likelihood of cutting R&D for these firm-years. The results are 
consistent with this prediction, further alleviating the concern that our finding for the SD group is 
driven by unobserved firm or CEO characteristics that affect both CEO contracts and R&D 
decisions.  
To reinforce our main inference, we examine whether the impact of CEO contractual 
protection on managerial short-termism increases with the duration and monetary strength of the 
protection. We find that, as expected, the impact is stronger when the duration of CEO protection 
is longer and when the monetary protection provided by the severance pay is of greater 
magnitude. Our findings are also robust to a battery of sensitivity tests.  
We conduct a series of cross-sectional analyses to provide additional insights. First, we 
examine whether the impact of CEO contractual protection on managerial short-termism varies 
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with industry homogeneity. When the firm is in a more homogenous industry, it is easier to find 
a suitable CEO candidate and the threat of CEO dismissal is thus higher (e.g., Parrino 1997). 
Accordingly, CEOs without contractual protection may be more likely to engage in myopic 
behavior and the impact of CEO protection is thus greater in more homogeneous industries. 
Second, when shareholders have shorter investment horizon, CEOs are under greater pressure to 
deliver short-term performance (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1990). Thus, we predict that CEO 
contractual protection is more important for firms with higher ownership by transient 
institutional investors. Third, we examine how the impact of CEO protection varies with 
alternative monitoring mechanism. Since CEO protection and board monitoring are alternative 
mechanisms in addressing managerial short-termism, we predict that the impact of CEO 
protection is stronger when board independence is lower. Our empirical findings are consistent 
with all the above predictions.  
In an additional test, we use the extent of real earnings management as an alternative proxy 
for managerial myopic behavior. Following prior studies, we measure real earnings management 
using abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenditures and combine them to 
capture the overall extent of real earnings management. We focus on the suspect firms – firms 
that meet or just beat earnings targets – in the analyses because these firms are more likely to 
have engaged in real earnings management to meet short-term performance targets. We find that, 
among the suspect firms, firms with CEO contractual protection are associated with a lower 
extent of real earnings management compared to those without CEO protection. This finding 
lends further support to our inference that CEO contractual protection mitigates managerial 
short-termism.  
Lastly, we perform tests to substantiate our assumptions and to address alternative 
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explanations. Consistent with our argument that cutting R&D to achieve earnings targets is a 
manifestation of managerial myopia, we find that within the SD group, cutting R&D is 
associated with poorer performance in the future. Confirming our assumption that CEO 
employment contracts can protect CEOs from short-term performance swing and downside risk, 
we find that CEO contractual protection reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover after poor 
performance. Our tests also suggest that alternative explanations (e.g., differential investment 
opportunities or the quiet life story) do not explain our results. For example, if our results are 
driven by differential investment opportunities between firms with and without CEO contractual 
protection, we expect to obtain similar results for other types of investments, such as capital 
expenditures. In contrast, under our managerial myopia argument, we should not obtain similar 
results because unlike cutting R&D, cutting capital expenditures does not improve the current 
year’s earnings. Consistent with our argument and inconsistent with the alternative explanation, 
we do not find significant difference in the likelihood of cutting capital expenditures between 
firms with and without CEO contractual protection.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, we contribute to the 
literature on managerial short-termism by documenting the impact of CEO contractual protection 
on managerial short-termism. Our evidence suggests that, apart from board monitoring and CEO 
incentive compensation, CEO employment contracts can also help address managerial myopia. 
Our paper thus extends prior studies on CEO myopia, such as Dechow and Sloan (1991) and 
Cheng (2004). These studies find that CEOs who are close to retirement are more myopic and 
that equity incentives can partially alleviate such myopia. By explicitly controlling for CEO age 
and CEO equity incentives in the analyses, we provide evidence on the incremental impact of 
CEO contracts, including employment agreements and standalone severance pay agreements, 
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both of which are widely used in practice. We would like to note that while both CEO equity 
incentives and contractual protection can address myopic behavior, the underlying reasons are 
different. While the former enhances the upside potential so that CEOs enjoy the benefits of 
successful long-term investments, the latter increases the job security and reduces the downside 
risk so that CEOs are less concerned with the adverse consequences of unsuccessful long-term 
investments (Rau and Xu 2013).  
Second, we contribute to the emerging literature on CEO employment contracts. This 
literature so far mainly focuses on the determinants of CEO contracts. We extend this literature 
by examining the impact of CEO contracts on corporate decisions.4 While the popular press 
often associates employment agreements and ex post severance pay with managerial power and 
entrenchment, our evidence suggests that ex ante such contracts can expand managers’ horizon 
and address the agency problem of managerial short-termism. This speaks to the benefits of 
employment agreements and severance pay agreements. A caveat is that such contracts have 
costs as well. For example, CEOs with contractual protection may shirk or become entrenched. 
Examining the net benefits or costs of CEO contracts is beyond the scope of our paper.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes prior research 
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample and data. Section 4 examines the 
determinants of CEO contractual protection and discusses how we address the endogeneity issue. 
                                                 
4 Note that our paper focuses on managerial myopia – cutting R&D or engaging in real earnings management to 
meet short-term earnings targets. It differs from concurrent studies that examine the impact of CEO contracts on 
firms’ risk-taking (e.g., Huang 2010; Xu 2011). These studies find that on average CEO contracts are positively 
correlated with the level of long-term investments, including R&D and capital expenditures. In contrast, we examine 
whether managers cut R&D when they face a tradeoff between meeting short-term earnings targets and maintaining 
R&D investments, circumstances where myopic behavior is most likely to occur. We find that CEO contractual 
protection reduces CEOs’ tendency to cut R&D in such situations (i.e., the SD group). At the same time, we find 
that CEO protection is not associated with the change in R&D for the other firm-years where CEO myopic behavior 
is not expected. This contrast in results highlights that in order to examine managerial myopia, it is critical to 
identify circumstances where managerial myopia is most salient. In addition, we examine the impact of CEO 
contracts on real earnings management.  
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Section 5 reports the main analyses and the cross-sectional tests. Section 6 reports the analyses 
using alternative proxies for managerial myopia and Section 7 presents the analyses that 
substantiate our assumptions and address alternative explanations. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Prior research and hypothesis development 
2.1 Prior research on CEO employment agreements and severance pay agreements  
In this section we discuss the background and prior literature related to CEO employment 
agreements and severance pay agreements.  
CEO employment agreement (EA) refers to a comprehensive written agreement that 
specifies the employment terms between the firm and the CEO, including the CEO’s 
responsibilities, compensation, perquisites, termination conditions and payments (e.g., severance 
pay), and restrictions on outside activities. Note that compensation contract alone is not regarded 
as an EA. A typical EA has a fixed term of two to five years and can get renewed, amended or 
extended. Among the S&P 500 firms in 2000, Gillan et al. (2009) find that 225 firms have EAs 
with their CEOs with an average term of three years. Within the contract terms, CEOs cannot be 
dismissed without good cause. “Good cause,” as specified in EAs, usually includes breach of 
fiduciary duties and willful misconduct but does not include incompetence or poor performance. 
In contrast, CEOs without EAs are employed at will. For example, General Electric Company 
(GE) does not have an EA with its CEO. In its 2006 proxy statement, GE states that “GE does 
not, in general, enter into employment agreements with our senior executive officers. They serve 
at the will of the Board. This enables the company to remove a senior executive officer prior to 
retirement whenever it is in the best interests of the company.”  
Therefore, from a CEO’s perspective, an EA benefits the CEO by offering protection over 
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the contract period. This benefit is likely higher when it is uncertain whether the CEO is a good 
fit for the company and when the likelihood of CEO dismissal is high (Schwab and Thomas 
2006). From the firm’s perspective, an EA allows the firm to attract CEO candidates who 
otherwise would not consider the position. At the same time, an EA is costly to the firm because 
it is more difficult to renegotiate with a CEO with an EA or to terminate the employment. Gillan 
et al. (2009) study the determinants of EAs among S&P 500 firms. They find that firms with 
higher volatility of sales growth, with lower market-adjusted returns, and in industries with lower 
survival rate, are more likely to have EAs with their CEOs, consistent with CEOs being more 
likely to seek protection when the uncertainty of the business environment is high. They also find 
that firms in more homogeneous industries and those with outside CEOs are more likely to have 
EAs with their CEOs, consistent with CEOs having a greater demand for contractual protection 
when there is a greater likelihood of being replaced. Lastly, they find that CEOs with higher 
salary and more incentive-based compensation are more likely to have EAs, consistent with the 
notion that contractual protection is more important when CEOs have more to lose.  
A standalone severance pay agreement (SA) specifies the amount and conditions of the 
payments to a CEO upon the CEO’s dismissal without good cause. The definition of good cause 
is similar to that in EAs. Unlike an EA, an SA typically does not have a definite term and 
therefore will cover the CEO in the foreseeable future. While some argue that SA reflects CEO 
entrenchment and poor corporate governance (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2004), others argue that it 
is part of the optimal contract between the firm and its CEO. First, a firm’s performance in the 
future is informative of the CEO’s ability and efforts. Therefore, an optimal contract should 
include deferred compensation that is based on the firm’s performance in the future, and 
severance pay is one form of deferred compensation (Fama 1980). Second, the threat of 
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dismissal can lead to agency problems, such as avoiding risky but positive net present value 
projects or engaging in suboptimal behavior in order to deliver short-term performance. SAs, by 
compensating CEOs upon dismissal, can be used ex ante to address such problems (Almazan and 
Suarez 2003; Inderst and Mueller 2005; Rau and Xu 2013).  
The studies to date provide evidence consistent with both the entrenchment and optimal 
contracting arguments. For example, Yermack (2006) and Rusticus (2006) find that the use of 
SAs is higher for firms with weaker corporate governance, larger firms, firms in more uncertain 
operating environments, and firms with outside CEOs. Rau and Xu (2013) conclude that SA is 
largely a form of compensation for risk; they find that SAs are more likely to be used when 
executives’ human capital is at greater risk and they do not find evidence suggesting that SAs 
reflect CEOs’ rent extraction. Cadman et al. (2011) draw a similar conclusion.  
Note that while the popular press sometimes laments the excessive ex post severance 
payments, the above studies and this paper focus on the ex ante severance pay agreements, not 
the ex post severance payments.  
2.2 The main hypothesis  
Whether a CEO has contractual protection can affect a firm’s operations. Gillan et al. 
(2009) argue that “CEOs facing less uncertainty are less likely to avoid risky positive net present 
value projects or to pursue overly conservative financing and dividend policies.” Firms make 
similar arguments. For example, in its 2003 proxy statement, Sysco states that “Severance 
agreements were in the best interest of the Company and its stockholders in that they secure the 
continued services of these executive officers and ensure their undivided dedication to their 
duties without being influenced by the uncertainty of continued employment.” Recent studies 
provide evidence consistent with CEO contractual protection influencing firms’ investments 
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(Huang 2010; Xu 2011).  
We focus on how CEO contractual protection affects managerial myopia, i.e., whether 
managers cut long-term investments in order to achieve short-term earnings targets. First, CEO 
contractual protection enhances job security. It is more costly for a firm to dismiss a CEO with 
contractual protection and hence the CEO will be better protected from short-term performance 
swing, compared to a CEO without contractual protection. Prior studies provide evidence 
consistent with this argument. For example, Rusticus (2006) and Xu (2010) find that CEO 
employment agreements and severance pay agreements reduce the likelihood of CEO turnover. 
We confirm in our sample that CEO contractual protection reduces the likelihood of CEO 
turnover after poor performance (see Section 7 for details). Second, CEO contractual protection 
also partly shields a CEO from downside risk. The termination payments under the employment 
agreement or the standalone severance pay agreement act as a form of deferred compensation 
and safeguard against downside risk, thus encouraging the CEO to undertake long-term, risky 
projects. 
In contrast, CEOs without contractual protection are subject to higher risk of losing their 
jobs after poor short-term performance and are more exposed to downside risk. Prior research 
(e.g., Dikolli et al. 2009; Mergenthaler et al. 2011) finds that failing to meet earnings targets 
significantly increases the likelihood of CEO turnover. Under the pressure to deliver short-term 
performance and to protect themselves from downside risk, these CEOs are more likely to 
engage in myopic behavior, provided that the board and/or investors cannot fully understand the 
implications of such behavior (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 1995; DeFond and Park 1997).  
The above discussion leads to our first hypothesis:  
H1: Ceteris paribus, CEOs with contractual protection are less likely to engage in myopic 
behavior than other CEOs. 
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An alternative view is that CEO contractual protection is reflective of agency problems in 
the firm and captures CEO’s rent extraction. That is, entrenched CEOs obtain employment 
agreements or severance pay agreements to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders. If 
this is the case, we will not find evidence consistent with H1.5  
2.3 Cross-sectional variation 
In this section, we develop predictions for the cross-sectional variation in the impact of 
CEO contractual protection on CEO’s myopic behavior. As discussed above, the two key 
elements underlying H1 are (1) the protection of CEOs under the contracts and (2) the capital 
market pressure to deliver short-term performance. Therefore, we focus on firm characteristics 
that are related to the importance of CEO contractual protection and the degree of capital market 
pressure. Specifically, we examine the ease of finding an alternative CEO as proxied by industry 
homogeneity and the pressure on the CEO to deliver short-term performance as captured by 
shareholders’ investment horizon. In addition, we predict how the impact of contractual 
protection on CEOs’ myopic behavior varies with the effectiveness of board monitoring.  
Industry homogeneity 
Parrino (1997) argues that firms prefer CEO candidates with experiences in a similar 
industry. Because it is easier for firms in more homogeneous industries to find CEO candidates, 
these firms are more likely to replace CEOs. Consistent with this argument, Parrino (1997) finds 
that both the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and the likelihood of an intra-industry 
                                                 
5 One might argue that this alternative view is more likely to be true for renegotiated contracts than for initial 
contracts because renegotiated contracts are more likely to be influenced by CEOs. If this is the case, the results will 
be weaker for renegotiated contracts than for initial contracts. To test this prediction, we classify the first 
employment agreement for a CEO-firm pair and the severance pay agreements (which typically have no expiration 
dates) as initial contracts, and the other employment agreements, including extended or amended ones, as 
renegotiated contracts. Among firm-years with CEO protection, about 70% are under initial contracts and the rest 
are under renegotiated contracts. In an untabulated analysis, we find that the results are significant for both types of 
contracts, but the results are weaker for renegotiated contracts than for initial contracts, consistent with CEO 
entrenchment playing a more important role in renegotiated contracts.  
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appointment (i.e., replacing the current CEO with executives from the same industry) increase 
with industry homogeneity.  
Therefore, without contractual protection, CEOs in homogeneous industries have stronger 
incentives to undertake myopic behavior to meet short-term performance targets due to their job 
security concerns, compared to CEOs in heterogeneous industries. DeFond and Park (1997) 
provide evidence consistent with this argument. We thus expect CEO contractual protection to be 
more important in curbing CEOs’ myopic behavior in homogeneous industries than in 
heterogeneous industries.  
Our second hypothesis is thus stated as follows:  
H2: Ceteris paribus, the moderating effect of CEO contractual protection on the extent of 
myopic behavior, as hypothesized in H1, is stronger in homogeneous industries than in 
heterogeneous industries. 
 
Note that the above discussion focuses on the CEO’s incentives to meet short-term 
performance targets due to job security concerns. At the same time, CEOs may also have 
incentives to meet short-term performance targets in order to move upward, i.e., moving to a 
larger firm with potentially higher compensation. This may be more likely to occur in 
homogenous industries because the CEO’s skill is more valuable for similar firms. We 
investigate such possibilities by separately examining CEO turnovers for better performing and 
poorly performing CEOs in our sample. We find that for better performing CEOs, CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity is insignificant and does not vary with industry homogeneity. This 
finding can be due to firms’ efforts to retain better performing CEOs or other factors affecting 
CEO upward mobility (such as firms’ long term strategy and CEO adaptability). In contrast, for 
poorly performing CEOs, we find that CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is significant and 
increases with industry homogeneity, consistent with Parrino (1997). We therefore infer that 
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CEO’s job dismissal concerns, compared to CEO’s incentives to move upward, are more likely 
to contribute to CEO’s strong incentives to meet short-term performance targets in homogenous 
industries.  
Shareholders’ investment horizon  
One of the underlying reasons for managerial short-termism is the fixation of capital 
market participants on short-term performance. For example, the Aspen Institute report of 
“Overcoming Short-termism” argues that the focus on short-term trading gains of fund managers 
and the focus on quarterly earnings of investors with short investment horizon can lead 
executives to pursue strategies that please these fund managers and investors but jeopardize the 
company’s long-term value maximization. Shleifer and Vishny (1990) show analytically that 
shareholders with short investment horizon can induce managers to focus on short-term 
performance. Empirically, Bushee (1998) documents that transient institutional investors, who 
have short investment horizon, are more likely to induce managers’ myopic behavior. Without 
contractual protection, CEOs in firms with higher transient institutional ownership are under 
greater pressure to deliver short-term performance given the extensive evidence that CEO’s 
welfare (e.g., reputation, compensation, and job security) is positively correlated with stock 
market performance. Thus, we expect that CEO contractual protection is more important in 
curbing CEOs’ myopic behavior in firms with higher transient institutional ownership. This 
discussion leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, the moderating effect of CEO contractual protection on the extent of 
myopic behavior, as hypothesized in H1, is stronger in firms with higher transient 
institutional ownership than in other firms. 
 
Board monitoring 
If board monitoring and CEO contractual protection are alternative mechanisms to address 
managerial short-termism, CEO contractual protection will be less important in the presence of 
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more effective board monitoring, and vice versa. 6 Prior studies have shown that the effectiveness 
of board monitoring increases with board independence. For example, prior studies document 
that board independence can reduce managerial myopia and as a response to managerial myopia, 
firms increase board independence (e.g., Klein 2002; Farber 2005; Srinivasan 2005). We thus 
use board independence to proxy for board monitoring and our fourth hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
 H4: Ceteris paribus, the moderating effect of CEO contractual protection on the extent of 
myopic behavior, as hypothesized in H1, is stronger in firms with lower board 
independence than in other firms. 
 
3. Sample and research design 
3.1 Sample and data 
Our sample includes S&P 500 firms over the period 1995-2008. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that companies disclose material employment agreements 
and severance pay agreements with top executives in the proxy statements (Regulation S-K, 17 
CFR 299.601). For each firm-year, we hand collect information on such agreements for CEOs 
from the proxy statements. Table 1, Panel A describes our sample selection process. We start 
with 6,973 firm-years that have proxy statements available from EDGAR. As mentioned earlier, 
our main proxy for managerial myopia is whether CEOs cut R&D expenditures to avoid earnings 
decreases. Since this proxy is not meaningful for firms with insignificant R&D expenditures, we 
drop the firm-years that have missing or insignificant R&D expenditures. Specifically, we 
require that the firm have non-missing R&D in the current year and that the firm have R&D 
                                                 
6 As reported in Section 4, we find that the likelihood of CEO contractual protection is higher in firms with lower 
board independence, supporting the notion that CEO contractual protection and board monitoring are substitutes in 
addressing managerial short-termism. 
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expenditures greater than 1% of sales in the prior year.7 We exclude firm-years that do not have 
the data to calculate other variables. Our final sample consists of 2,027 firm-years.  
Table 1, Panel B presents the sample distribution by year. On average, 70.5% of the sample 
firm-years have CEO contractual protection.8 The percentage of firms with CEO protection 
increases steadily over time, from around 60% in the mid-1990s to more than 75% in the last 
several years of the sample period.9,10  
Table 1, Panel C reports the descriptive statistics on firm characteristics, separately for 
firm-years with and without CEO contractual protection. The two groups of firms are not 
significantly different from each other except that firms without CEO protection are larger and 
have higher Tobin’s Q, lower leverage, lower institutional ownership, higher CEO equity 
incentives, and lower CEO abnormal compensation. We control for all these characteristics in 
our analyses.  
3.2 Research design 
Following Baber et al. (1991) and Bushee (1998), we compare the pre-tax, pre-R&D 
earnings of the current year (i.e., the sum of pre-tax earnings and R&D expenditures) with that of 
                                                 
7 We require significant R&D expenditures in the prior year, instead of in the current year, to allow for the 
possibility that the firm has cut R&D in the current year to achieve earnings goals. If we only require significant 
R&D in the prior year and do not impose any restriction on the current year’s R&D (assuming missing R&D as 
zero), the sample size increases by about 2% and the results are quantitatively similar. Separately, the inferences 
remain qualitatively similar if we do not require that the sample firm-years have significant R&D expenditures.  
8 This percentage is higher than what is reported in prior research because prior research focuses on either 
employment agreements or standalone severance pay agreements, not both. About 36% of our sample firm-years 
have CEO employment agreements and about 34% have standalone CEO severance pay agreements. Note that the 
two types of contractual protection are exclusive; firms with contractual protection include those with employment 
agreements, which almost always include a termination/severance pay term, and those with standalone severance 
pay agreements. 
9 The results are robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects in the regressions. The percentage of firms with CEO 
protection varies across industries. For instance, while about 91% of the firms in the Construction Materials industry 
have CEO protection, only about 59% of the firms in the Computers industry have CEO protection. The results are 
robust to the inclusion of industry fixed effects in the regressions. 
10 We find that there is a high concentration of firms with headquarters in the state of Delaware. However, there is 
no significant difference in the percentage of Delaware firms between firms with and without CEO protection. 
Including an indicator for Delaware firms in the regressions leads to quantitatively similar results.  
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the prior year.11 If there is a decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings, but the decrease is 
smaller than the prior year’s R&D, then the firm can potentially avoid an earnings decrease by 
cutting R&D. This group of firm-years is referred to as the small earnings decrease (SD) 
group.12, 13 Within the SD group, myopic managers have incentives to cut R&D in order to avoid 
earnings decreases. Therefore, we use the likelihood of cutting R&D within the SD group to 
capture the extent of managerial myopia. Our hypothesis H1 predicts that CEO contractual 
protection helps alleviate managerial myopia and reduce managers’ tendency to cut R&D in the 
SD group. To test this prediction, we estimate the following probit regression for the SD group:  
ܲݎ݋ܾሺܴܦ_ܦ݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁௜,௧ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚܥܧܱ	_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ∆ܴܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଶ∆ܫ݊݀_ܴܦ௜,௧ 
൅ߛଷ∆ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߛସܶ݋ܾ݅݊_ܳ௜,௧ ൅ ߛହ∆ܥܣܲ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߛ଺∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ 
൅ߛ଼ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁_ܩ݋݈ܽ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଽܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܨܥܨ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଵܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ 
൅ߛଵଶܥܧܱ_ܣ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଷܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ௜,௧൅ߛଵସܥܧܱ_ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ_ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,  (1) 
 
where RD_Decreasei,t is an indicator for cutting R&D, 1 if R&D decreases for firm i in year t 
compared to the prior year, and 0 otherwise; CEO_Protectioni,t is an indicator for CEO 
contractual protection, 1 if the CEO has an employment agreement or a standalone severance pay 
agreement, and 0 otherwise. H1 implies that β is negative. The variable measurements are 
described in detail in Appendix A. The standard errors are adjusted for firm and year clustering.  
Following Bushee (1998), we control for factors that may affect R&D investments and 
hence the likelihood of cutting R&D. Last year’s change in R&D (∆RD) captures the trend in 
                                                 
11 Specifically, the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings are the sum of pre-tax income (Compustat item PI) and R&D 
expenditures. According to the Compustat manual, PI excludes minority interest, extraordinary items, and 
discontinued operations. In an untabulated analysis, we calculate the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings as the sum of 
income before extraordinary items, tax expenses, and R&D expenditures. The results are quantitatively similar. 
12 One potential complication is the effect of R&D tax credit. Bushee (1998) finds that the sample classification after 
considering the estimated R&D tax credit is highly correlated with the original sample classification. Note that the 
misclassification of the SD group likely biases against finding results consistent with our hypotheses. In addition, we 
hand-collect information on R&D tax credit from the income tax footnotes to financial statements. In untabulated 
analyses, we exclude either (i) firm-years with large R&D tax credit (greater than 0.25% of sales), or (ii) firm-years 
with any non-zero R&D tax credit. The results are quantitatively similar. A caveat is that R&D tax credit obtained 
from the income tax footnotes may still contain measurement errors.  
13 Note that the decrease here refers to the decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings, not the decrease in the actual 
earnings. We use the same terms as in Bushee (1998) to be consistent.  
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R&D investments. A continuation of the trend implies a negative coefficient on this variable, 
whereas a reversal of the trend implies a positive coefficient. The change in industry R&D 
intensity (∆Ind_RD) and the change in GDP (∆GDP) capture the R&D investment opportunities 
at the industry and economy levels, respectively. Tobin’s Q (Tobin_Q), the change in capital 
expenditures (∆CAPX), and the change in sales (∆Sales) capture the firm’s growth opportunities. 
The investment opportunity and growth opportunity variables are predicted to be negatively 
associated with the likelihood of cutting R&D. Firm size (SIZE) captures cash constraints. 
Smaller firms are more likely to suffer cash shortage that can lead them to cut R&D. Thus the 
coefficient on size is predicted to be negative. The distance from earnings goal (Distance_Goal) 
captures the change in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings. The more negative this variable is, the 
more difficult it is for the firm to meet earnings goals by cutting R&D, and thus the less likely 
the firm is going to cut R&D. This implies a positive coefficient on Distance_Goal. Leverage 
(Leverage) captures the firm’s incentives to increase earnings to reduce debt contracting costs 
and is predicted to be positively correlated with the likelihood of cutting R&D. Free cash flows 
(FCF) captures fund availability and is predicted to be negatively correlated with the likelihood 
of cutting R&D. Institutional ownership (INST) captures the monitoring by institutional investors 
and is predicted to have a negative coefficient.  
We also control for three variables related to CEO incentives. First, Dechow and Sloan 
(1991) find that CEOs who are closer to retirement are more myopic and are thus more likely to 
cut R&D. Accordingly, we include an indicator for CEOs who are 63 or older (CEO_Age). 
Second, prior research (e.g., Dechow and Sloan 1991; Cheng 2004) find that equity incentives 
can reduce managers’ tendency to engage in myopic behavior. Thus we control for CEO’s equity 
incentives (CEO_Equity). Lastly, more capable CEOs may be less likely to resort to cutting 
18 
 
R&D to achieve earnings targets because they are more confident in improving firm performance 
and/or less concerned with being replaced. Following Gillan et al. (2009), we use CEO’s 
abnormal compensation (CEO_Abnormal_Comp) to proxy for CEO’s ability.  
Apart from the SD group, the rest of the sample falls into two groups: the large earnings 
decrease (LD) group and the earnings increase (IN) group. The LD group includes the firm-years 
whose pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings fall short of the prior year’s by an amount greater than the 
prior year’s R&D. Firms in this group will not be able to avoid earnings declines by cutting 
R&D. The IN group includes the firm-years whose pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings exceed the prior 
year’s. Firms in this group do not need to cut R&D to report an increase in earnings. Therefore, 
managers in these two groups do not have incentives to cut R&D to achieve short-term earnings 
goals, although they might cut R&D for other reasons (e.g., due to lack of economic resources in 
the case of the LD group). If, as we hypothesize, CEO contractual protection affects the 
likelihood of cutting R&D through its impact on managerial myopia, we expect the CEO 
protection indicator to have an insignificant coefficient in the regressions using these two groups. 
Accordingly, we use them as our comparison groups. Not finding results for the comparison 
groups can help alleviate the concern that our findings for the SD group are driven by omitted 
firm or CEO characteristics that affect both R&D investments and CEO protection.  
Panel D of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the regression variables, separately for 
the three groups of firms, as well as the p-values of the differences in means between the SD 
group and the other two groups. For almost all the variables, the mean for the SD group lies 
between the LD and IN groups, consistent with the performance ranking of the three groups. 
Note that we control for all these variables in the regressions. 
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4. Determinants of CEO contractual protection and controlling for endogeneity 
4.1 Determinants of CEO contractual protection 
Whether a firm has CEO contractual protection is not random. In this section, we build on 
prior research and investigate why some firm-years have CEO contractual protection and others 
do not. In the next section, we discuss how we address this endogeneity issue.  
We follow prior research in choosing the explanatory variables for CEO contractual 
protection. First, we consider the impact of state contracting laws. Prior research indicates that 
the design of employment contracts is influenced by state laws on exceptions to employment at 
will (e.g., Muhl 2001; Autor et al. 2004). The states can adopt one or more of the three 
commonly used exceptions that limit employers’ ability to fire employees at will: public policy, 
implied contract, and good faith and fair dealing. Under the “public policy” exception, the 
employer may not fire the employee if the dismissal violates the state’s public policy. Under the 
“implied contract” policy, the employer may not fire the employee if an implied contract is 
formed between the two parties. The “good faith and fair dealing” exception means that 
employers cannot fire employees in bad faith, such as to deprive employees of their benefits. 
With these exceptions, employees are better protected from dismissals and as such, the 
importance of CEO contractual protection is lower, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO 
protection.14 
We also consider two other state policies: anti-takeover regulations and the enforcement of 
non-competition agreements. In states with anti-takeover regulations, firms are less likely to be 
acquired and CEOs are thus protected from takeover pressure (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 
1999). Garmaise (2011) finds that in states where non-competition agreements are better 
                                                 
14 This discussion suggests that even for CEOs without contractual protection, they may have implicit protection, for 
example, from state contracting laws. Therefore what we capture in this study is the differential effect of explicit 
CEO contractual protection.  
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enforced, executive stability increases. Thus both anti-takeover regulations and enforcement of 
non-competition agreements reduce the importance of CEO contractual protection, leading to a 
lower likelihood of CEO protection.  
Second, we rely on prior research to identify variables that capture firms’ and CEOs’ 
incentives to have CEO protection (Knoeber 1986; Almazan and Suarez 2003; Rusticus 2006; 
Yermack 2006; Gillan et al. 2009; Rau and Xu 2013):  
1) Uncertainty of the firm-CEO fit. The uncertainty of the firm-CEO fit is higher for firms 
with uncertain business environment or CEOs with limited experiences of running the 
firm. In such cases, CEOs are more likely to be replaced and as a result, are more likely 
to demand contractual protection. Following prior research, we use R&D intensity, 
growth opportunities (proxied by the market-to-book ratio), and poor performance 
(performance proxied for by market-adjusted returns and ROA) to capture uncertainty in 
the business environment; we use an indicator for outside CEOs to capture CEOs’ lack of 
experience of running the firm. We expect positive coefficients on R&D intensity, the 
market-to-book ratio, and the indicator for outside CEOs, and negative coefficients on 
market-adjusted returns and ROA.  
2) CEOs’ potential monetary loss from being replaced. CEO contractual protection is more 
important if the CEO has more to lose when being replaced. The CEO has more to lose 
when the CEO has more years until retirement, higher compensation, or more incentive-
based compensation (unvested options/stocks will be foregone upon being replaced). 
Thus, we expect the use of CEO contractual protection to decrease with CEO age, but to 
increase with CEO’s abnormal compensation and incentive-based compensation.  
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3) Alternative mechanisms to address CEO short-termism.15 As discussed above, CEO 
contractual protection can address short-termism. Such benefits are lower when there are 
alternative ways to do so or when CEOs are less likely to be myopic. Prior research 
shows that CEOs in firms with more independent boards and founder CEOs are less 
likely to be myopic (e.g., Chen et al. 2008; Duchin et al. 2010). As such, we expect that 
the use of CEO contractual protection is lower when board independence is higher and 
when the CEO is a founder.  
In addition, we control for leverage and firm size (proxied by total assets); we do not have signed 
predictions for these two variables.16  
To investigate the determinants of CEO protection, we estimate a probit regression of the 
likelihood of CEO contractual protection on the above variables. Table 2 provides the detailed 
variable measurements and the regression results. Because there is a significant variation in the 
use of CEO contractual protection across industries, we estimate the regressions by industry to 
improve the goodness of fit of the model. Table 2 reports the average coefficients across the 
industries and the p-values based on the coefficients across industries.17  
The results are generally consistent with the predictions. Column (1) examines the state 
policy variables. As shown in the table, the likelihood of CEO contractual protection is lower in 
states that provide better protection to employees, have anti-takeover regulations, and better 
                                                 
15 How firms choose among alternative mechanisms to address CEO short-termism (including different forms of 
CEO contracts –  CEO employment agreements or standalone severance pay agreements) likely depends on the 
benefits and costs of various mechanisms. We leave this for future exploration.  
16 Note that the above list includes the most important determinants of CEO contractual protection based on prior 
studies. It is by no means a complete list. Also note that some predicted associations may be consistent with 
alternative interpretations. For example, the predicted negative association between CEO protection and board 
independence and the predicted positive association between CEO protection and CEO compensation are also 
consistent with CEO extracting rents through contractual protection (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2004). We refer 
readers to prior studies for more detailed discussions. 
17 The sample used in this table includes 2,977 firm-years. The number of firm-years is larger than that in the main 
analyses because we do not need to require that R&D is non-missing and of significant amount. We drop the firm-
years in industries with too few observations to estimate the regressions.  
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enforce non-competition agreements. Column (2) examines the firm and CEO characteristics. 
The likelihood of CEO contractual protection increases with R&D intensity and the market to-
book ratio and decreases with performance; CEO contractual protection is less likely for older 
CEOs and is more likely for CEOs with higher abnormal compensation and incentive-based 
compensation; CEO contractual protection is less likely when board independence is higher and 
when the CEO is a founder; and CEO contractual protection is less likely for larger firms. 
Column (3) reports the regression results and the corresponding marginal effects when all the 
variables are included. The inferences remain similar. The marginal effects indicate that these 
variables have economically significant impact on the use of CEO contractual protection.  
Overall, the above results indicate that the use of CEO contractual protection is 
systematically affected by state laws, the uncertainty in business environment, CEO’s potential 
loss from being replaced, and alternative mechanisms used to address managerial short-termism.  
4.2 Controlling for the endogeneity of CEO contractual protection 
Since certain firm and CEO characteristics can be correlated with both the use of CEO 
protection and managerial short-termism (as proxied by the likelihood of cutting R&D to meet 
earnings targets), we use two approaches to address the potential endogeneity of CEO 
contractual protection. First, in regression (1), we replace the CEO protection indicator with its 
predicted value estimated from the model of determinants of CEO protection (the full model in 
Table 2). Second, we add to regression (1) the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the 
determinants model (Heckman 1979). Both approaches have been widely used in the literature to 
address endogeneity (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004). Note that the state policy variables are exogenous 
instrument variables. While they affect the use of CEO contractual protection, there are no 
convincing arguments why they should directly affect individual firms’ decisions to cut R&D to 
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meet short-term earnings targets. In addition, we conduct the tests recommended in Larcker and 
Rusticus (2010) and find that these state policy variables are valid and effective instruments.18  
 
5. Main analyses and cross-sectional tests 
5.1 CEO contractual protection and managerial short-termism – univariate analyses 
Table 3 reports the univariate analysis results. H1 predicts that CEO contractual protection 
will reduce CEOs’ incentives to engage in myopic behavior, specifically, cutting R&D to avoid 
earnings decreases. This implies a negative correlation between CEO protection and the 
likelihood of cutting R&D for the small earnings decrease (SD) group. The results reported in 
Panel A are consistent with this prediction. While 65% of the firm-years without CEO protection 
cut R&D, only 45% of the firm-years with CEO protection do so. The difference of 20 
percentage points is both economically and statistically significant (p-value of the Chi-Square 
test is 0.001).  
As discussed earlier, we do not expect the likelihood of cutting R&D to be systematically 
related to CEO contractual protection for the large earnings decrease (LD) group and the 
earnings increase (IN) group. The results, as reported in Panel B of Table 3, are consistent with 
our prediction. In the LD group, the likelihood of cutting R&D is 68 and 71 percent for firms 
with and without CEO protection, respectively (p-value for the difference = 0.645).19 In the IN 
group, the likelihood of cutting R&D is the same, 24 percent, for firms with and without CEO 
                                                 
18 First, the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the state policy variables are not correlated with the use of CEO 
protection at the 0.001 level (the F-statistic is 24.21, higher than the recommended critical value of 15.09 in the case 
of five instruments). This suggests that the instruments are effective. Second, the over-identification test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with the second stage regression residuals. The J-
statistic is 1.45, while the critical value for the 10% significance level is 7.78 (chi-squared distribution with a degree 
of freedom of 4; degree of freedom is the number of instrument variables minus the number of endogenous 
variables). This indicates that the instruments are valid (i.e., exogenous). See Larcker and Rusticus (2010) for more 
detailed discussions of these tests.  
19 The higher likelihood of cutting R&D in the LD group is likely driven by these firms’ poor performance and lack 
of economic resources. 
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protection. The findings for the LD and IN groups help alleviate the concern that the finding for 
the SD group is driven by omitted firm or CEO characteristics that are correlated with both R&D 
investments and CEO contractual protection. For example, if CEOs with contractual protection 
tend to invest more in R&D and if this general tendency drives the lower likelihood of cutting 
R&D for firms with CEO protection in the SD group, then we should observe similar results in 
the comparison groups.  
In sum, the univariate analyses provide evidence consistent with H1. We now turn to 
multivariate analyses that control for potential confounding factors and the endogeneity of CEO 
contractual protection.  
5.2 CEO contractual protection and managerial short-termism – multivariate analyses 
In this section, we use regression analyses to examine the impact of CEO contractual 
protection on the likelihood of cutting R&D in the SD group. Table 4, Panel A reports the 
results. We first report the probit regression without controlling for endogeneity (Column (1)). 
We then replace the CEO protection indicator with its predicted value estimated from the first-
stage regression (Column (2)). In Column (3), we use the Heckman approach and include the 
Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the first-stage regression.  
Panel A, Column (1) shows that in the SD group, CEO contractual protection significantly 
reduces the likelihood of cutting R&D (p-value = 0.001). The marginal effect of CEO protection 
is -20.4 percent. This impact is economically significant given that the probability of cutting 
R&D in the SD group is 52 percent (Table 1, Panel D). In Column (2) where we use the 
predicted value for the probability of having CEO protection, the coefficient on CEO protection 
remains significantly negative. The p-value is 0.001 and the marginal effect is -21.7 percent. In 
the last column where we include the Inverse Mills Ratio, the result for CEO protection is 
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similar; the p-value is 0.001 and the marginal effect is -24.6 percent. Judged by the marginal 
effect, CEO protection appears to be among the most important variables in explaining the 
likelihood of cutting R&D.  
With respect to firm-level control variables, we find that change in capital expenditures and 
change in sales are negatively correlated with the likelihood of cutting R&D, suggesting that the 
likelihood of cutting R&D is lower when there are more investment and growth opportunities. 
The prior year’s change in R&D has a positive impact, consistent with mean reversion in R&D 
investments. With respect to CEO characteristics, we find that the CEO age dummy has a 
positive coefficient, consistent with the finding in prior research (e.g., Dechow and Sloan 1991) 
that CEOs closer to retirement are more myopic. We also find that CEO equity incentives and 
abnormal compensation are negatively correlated with the likelihood of cutting R&D. These 
results suggest that CEOs whose interest is better aligned with shareholders’ and who are more 
capable are less likely to engage in myopic behavior (e.g., Cheng 2004).20 The other control 
variables have insignificant coefficients.21  
In Table 4, Panel B, we report the regression results for the comparison groups. As 
expected, the coefficient on CEO contractual protection is insignificant for both groups, 
regardless of the model specifications.22 The results on the control variables for these two groups 
                                                 
20 The result on CEO equity incentives is robust to the exclusion of CEO contractual protection and CEO age 
variables, which are positively correlated with CEO equity incentives. While there is mixed evidence in the 
literature on whether equity incentives help alleviate managerial short-termism (e.g., Cheng and Warfield 2005; 
Erickson et al. 2006; Efendi et al. 2007; Armstrong et al. 2010), the negative coefficient on CEO equity incentives 
here is consistent with equity compensation helping address managerial myopia.  
21 As in Bushee (1998), the coefficient on Distance_Goal (distance from earnings goal) is insignificant, but it 
becomes significantly positive, as predicted, when we use total assets as the scalar for Distance_Goal. This result 
indicates that firms are more likely to cut R&D when the decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings is of smaller 
magnitude and thus it is easier to meet earnings targets by cutting R&D. The results on the variables of interest 
remain the same when we use this alternative definition of Distance_Goal. 
22 In an untabulated sensitivity test, we also estimate the regressions for the firm-years with small earnings increases 
in order to ensure that our results for the small earnings decrease (SD) group are not driven by the small magnitude 
of the change in earnings. Specifically, we examine the firm-years with the change in earnings in the bottom tercile 
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are similar to those for the SD group and are not tabulated to save space.  
In an alternative design, we include all the firm-years in the same regression by expanding 
regression (1). We include an indicator for the SD group (SD), which is 1 for firm-years in the 
SD group and 0 otherwise, and the interaction of CEO_Protection and SD. Under this 
specification, the coefficient on CEO_Protection captures the impact of CEO contractual 
protection on the likelihood of cutting R&D for the comparison groups (i.e., the LD and IN 
groups) and the coefficient on the interaction term, CEO_Protection × SD, captures the 
incremental impact of CEO contractual protection for the SD group. To save space we do not 
tabulate the results. We find that the coefficient on CEO_Protection is insignificant, indicating 
that CEO contractual protection does not affect the likelihood of cutting R&D for the comparison 
groups. More importantly, we find a significantly negative coefficient on CEO_Protection × SD, 
indicating that the incremental effect of CEO contractual protection on the likelihood of cutting 
R&D is significantly negative for the SD group. The inferences remain the same (1) if we 
separate the LD and IN groups (by adding an indicator for the IN group and its interaction with 
CEO_Protection); and (2) if we add to the regression the interactions of SD and the control 
variables (i.e., allowing the control variables to have different coefficients for the SD group). 
We conduct a series of sensitivity tests and find quantitatively similar results. We do not 
tabulate the results for the sake of brevity. 
(i) We find quantitatively similar results when we use the average R&D expenditures in 
the prior three years to determine whether there is a R&D cut in the current year. This 
indicates that our inferences are not driven by unusually high R&D expenditures in the 
prior year for firms without CEO protection.  
(ii) Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) can lead to noises in classifying the firm-years into 
the different groups. Hence we exclude the firm-years with M&As or the firm-years 
with major M&As (i.e., M&As with a deal value greater than 10% of the firm’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
within the earnings increase (IN) group. We find that the coefficient on CEO protection is insignificant for these 
firm-years across all the three specifications.  
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beginning-of-year total assets). The results are quantitatively similar.23  
(iii) It is unclear whether the last year’s R&D expenditures and earnings are the right 
benchmarks when a new CEO joins the firm. We find quantitatively similar results after 
excluding the firm-years when the CEO first joins the firm. 
(iv) In the main analyses, we follow Bushee (1998) and assume that the earnings target is 
the prior year’s earnings. Alternatively, we assume that managers wish to avoid losses 
and use zero as the earnings target by focusing on those firm-years where the pre-tax, 
pre-R&D earnings exceed zero by an amount smaller than the prior year’s R&D; these 
firms can avoid losses by cutting R&D. The inferences remain the same. Note that as in 
Bushee (1998), we do not use analyst forecast as the earnings target because using 
analyst forecast requires an estimate of analysts’ expectation of the current year’s R&D 
expenditures and tax expenses in order to calculate the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings 
target. Further complications arise if analysts anticipate a cut in R&D.  
(v) Our inferences remain the same after controlling for additional variables. First, one 
might argue that the different results for the three groups are driven by different levels 
of R&D across these groups. We find that these three groups do not differ significantly 
in the level of R&D. Also, controlling for the level of R&D in the regressions does not 
affect our inferences; the coefficient on the level of R&D is insignificant. Second, we 
obtain similar results on CEO protection after controlling for corporate governance 
(board independence and G-score), accrual earnings management (proxied by abnormal 
accruals), a founder CEO indicator, and industry fixed effects. We do not include these 
variables in the main analyses in order to make the model specifications tractable and 
comparable with prior research.  
(vi) While some firms consistently use or do not use CEO protection throughout the sample 
period, other firms switch back and forth (i.e., having it in some years but not in other 
years). To ensure that our results are not driven by the firms that consistently use or do 
not use CEO protection and to further alleviate the endogeneity concern (by using the 
same firm as control), we examine whether our results hold for the group of switch 
firms. The untabulated analysis indicates that the results are similar.  
(vii) In the main analyses, we combine employment agreements and severance pay 
agreements together because both types of agreements protect CEOs from short-term 
performance swing and downside risk. In an untabulated analysis, we investigate 
whether the results apply to both types. For this purpose, we construct two separate 
indicator variables for employment agreements and standalone severance pay 
agreements. We find that in the SD group, both indicators have significantly negative 
coefficients, indicating that both employment agreements and standalone severance pay 
agreements can reduce CEOs’ incentives to engage in myopic behavior. 
 
Overall, we find that firms with CEO contractual protection are less likely to cut R&D to 
avoid earnings decreases, compared to those without CEO contractual protection. This finding 
indicates that CEO contractual protection can reduce managerial short-termism. This inference is 
                                                 
23 We acknowledge that we cannot fully address the noises in identifying the SD group related to some accounting 
problems. While such noises should bias against finding results consistent with our predictions, we would like to 
remind readers to keep this caveat in mind when interpreting the results.  
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reinforced by our findings that CEO contractual protection has no impact on the likelihood of 
cutting R&D in the comparison groups, where managerial short-termism is not expected.  
5.3 CEO contractual protection and managerial short-termism – the duration and strength of 
protection 
To reinforce the main inference, in this section, we utilize the contract details and examine 
how the effect of CEO contractual protection on managerial myopia varies with the extent of 
CEO protection, specifically, the duration and monetary strength of CEO protection. We expect 
the effect to increase with both the duration and strength of CEO protection. To save space, 
hereafter we only tabulate the results for the SD group using the Heckman approach, while 
noting that (i) running the probit regressions without the Inverse Mills Ratio or using the 
predicted value of the probability of CEO protection in the regressions leads to qualitatively 
similar results, and (ii) the results on the variables of interest are insignificant for the comparison 
groups. 
First, we construct three indicator variables, Duration0, Duration1, and Duration2, to 
capture the duration of CEO contractual protection. Standalone severance pay agreements 
typically do not have an expiration date and hence can offer CEOs protection over the 
foreseeable future. While employment agreements are for a fixed period, some can be 
automatically renewed. Duration2 equals 1 for CEOs with standalone severance pay agreements 
and for CEOs with employment agreements with an automatic renewal clause, and 0 otherwise. 
Among CEOs with employment agreements without an automatic renewal clause, the ones in the 
earlier stage of employment agreements should be less concerned with contract renewal than 
those in the later stage. Accordingly, we use Duration1 and Duration0 to separately indicate the 
two groups; Duration1 (Duration0) equals 1 for firm-years in the earlier (later) stage of CEO 
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employment agreements without an automatic renewal clause, and 0 otherwise.24 Note that these 
three indicator variables are mutually exclusive and collectively cover all the firm-years with 
CEO contractual protection. As such, we do not include the indicator for CEO contractual 
protection in the regression. 
Column (1) of Table 5 reports the regression results. The results are consistent with our 
prediction. The coefficients on the three duration indicator variables are all negative. However, 
the coefficient on Duration0 is only marginally significantly different from zero (p-value is 
0.149), indicating that CEOs in the later stage of their employment agreements are only 
marginally less myopic than those without any contractual protection. In contrast, the 
coefficients on Duration1 and Duration2 are significantly different from zero at the 0.003 and 
0.001 levels, respectively. F-tests (untabulated) indicate that the coefficients on Duration1 and 
Duration2, while insignificantly different from each other, are significantly different from the 
coefficient on Duration0 (p-value is 0.045 and 0.031, respectively). These results indicate that 
the moderating effect of CEO contractual protection on the extent of myopic behavior increases 
with the duration of the protection. 
Second, the monetary strength of CEO protection also varies. To quantify the monetary 
strength, we rely on the amount of pre-determined severance pay in either the employment 
agreement or the standalone severance pay agreement. The agreements usually specify the 
severance pay as a multiple of the basic salary and also allow the unexercisable options 
(unvested stocks) to become immediately exercisable (vested). Because the latter portion is 
difficult to quantify ex ante, we follow Rau and Xu (2013) and code the severance pay multiple, 
                                                 
24 We use the sample median of the remaining contract years to distinguish between the earlier and later stage of 
employment agreements. Among the firm-years with CEO contractual protection, Duration2 is 1 for 60% of the 
firm-years, Duration1 is 1 for 20% of the firm-years, and Duration0 is 1 for 20% of the firm-years. Note that 
Duration2, Duration1, and Duration0 are all zero for firm-years without CEO contractual protection. 
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i.e., the number of times the severance pay is relative to the basic salary. We construct an ordinal 
variable, Strength, to capture the monetary strength of the protection. If the multiple is above 
three, we code Strength as 2; if the multiple is between two and three, we code Strength as 1; and 
if the multiple is below two, we code Strength as 0. Firm-years with CEO contractual protection 
but without information on severance pay are excluded from this analysis.25  
Column (2) of Table 5 reports the regression results. The regression includes both the CEO 
contractual protection indicator and the strength variable. As such, the coefficient on 
CEO_Protection captures the difference between firm-years with low severance pay multiple 
and those without CEO contractual protection, and the coefficient on Strength captures the 
incremental effect of the monetary strength of the protection. The results are consistent with our 
prediction. The coefficients on both CEO_Protection and Strength are significantly negative, 
indicating that CEO contractual protection can reduce the extent of myopic behavior and the 
effect further increases with the monetary strength of the protection. 
In sum, we find that the effect of CEO contractual protection in reducing myopic behavior 
increases with the duration and monetary strength of the protection. These findings reinforce the 
inference from the main analyses.  
5.4 CEO protection and managerial short-termism – cross-sectional analyses 
In this section, we report cross-sectional analyses that test hypotheses H2, H3, and H4. We 
add to the regressions the main effect of the conditional variable and its interaction with the CEO 
protection indicator. The regression model is as follows:  
ܲݎ݋ܾሺܴܦ_ܦ݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁௜,௧ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ_ܸܽݎ௜,௧ 
൅ߚଷܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൈ ܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ_ܸܽݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ∆ܴܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଶ∆ܫ݊݀_ܴܦ௜,௧ 
൅ߛଷ∆ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߛସܶ݋ܾ݅݊_ܳ௜,௧ ൅ ߛହ∆ܥܣܲ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߛ଺∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ 
                                                 
25 Among the firm-years with CEO contractual protection and information on severance pay, 32% have a severance 
pay multiple above three, 38% have a severance pay multiple between two and three, and 30% have a severance pay 
multiple below two. Strength is 0 for firm-years without CEO contractual protection. 
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൅ߛ଼ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁_ܩ݋݈ܽ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଽܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܨܥܨ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଵܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ 
൅ߛଵଶܥܧܱ_ܣ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଷܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ௜,௧൅ߛଵସܥܧܱ_ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ_ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ . (3) 
 
The conditional variable, Conditional_Var, is one of the following three indicator 
variables: Industry_Homogeneity, Transient_Inst, and Low_Board_Independence.26 They 
correspond to our hypotheses H2-H4. Industry_Homogeneity is one if the firm operates in an 
industry that is more homogeneous than the sample median, and zero otherwise. Following 
Parrino (1997), for each firm in the industry (based on two-digit SICs), we first calculate the 
percentage of the variation in monthly stock returns that is explained by an equal-weighted 
industry index over the previous ten years. We then measure industry homogeneity as the median 
across all firms in the industry. The assumption is that the more the stock prices of firms in the 
industry move together, the more homogeneous the industry is. Transient_Inst is one if the 
ownership of transient institutional investors in the firm is higher than the sample median, and 
zero otherwise.27 Low_Board_Independence is one if the percentage of independent directors is 
lower than the sample median, and zero otherwise. H2, H3, and H4 predict that the effect of 
CEO protection on the likelihood of cutting R&D in the SD group is more negative for firms in 
more homogenous industries, for firms with higher transient institutional ownership, and for 
firms with lower board independence. That is, the coefficient on the interaction term, β3, is 
expected to be negative for the SD group. 
Table 6 reports the regression results for the SD group. We first include the conditional 
variables one at a time and then include all of them together in the last column. The first column 
reports the results when Industry_Homogeneity and its interaction with CEO protection are 
included. The main effect of industry homogeneity is significantly positive (p-value is 0.012), 
                                                 
26 We use indicator variables to facilitate the interpretation of the results and to allow for non-linearity. In an 
untabulated sensitivity analysis, we also use the standardized decile ranks for the conditional variables and the 
inferences remain the same.  
27 We thank Brian Bushee for providing data on the classification of institutional investors.  
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suggesting that without CEO protection, industry homogeneity can induce myopic behavior, 
likely due to the higher threat of CEO dismissal in more homogeneous industries (e.g., DeFond 
and Park 1997). More importantly, consistent with H2, the impact of CEO protection on 
managerial myopia is greater in more homogeneous industries; the coefficient on the interaction 
of CEO protection and industry homogeneity is significantly negative (p-value is 0.004 and the 
marginal effect is -29.0 percent).28  
The second column of Table 6 presents a similar picture with respect to transient 
institutional ownership. The main effect of transient institutional ownership is significantly 
positive (p-value is 0.052), consistent with transient institutional investors’ short horizon 
incentivizing managers to deliver short-run performance (Bushee 1998). More importantly, 
consistent with H3, the impact of CEO protection on managerial myopia is greater in firms with 
higher transient institutional ownership; the coefficient on the interaction of CEO protection and 
transient institutional ownership is significantly negative (p-value is 0.028 and the marginal 
effect is -21.1 percent). 
The third column presents the results with respect to board independence. The main effect 
of low board independence is significantly positive (p-value is 0.015), consistent with the role of 
board monitoring in alleviating managerial myopia. Consistent with H4, the interactive effect is 
significantly negative (p-value is 0.019 and the marginal effect is -24.8 percent). This finding 
suggests that the incremental effect of CEO protection is stronger when board independence is 
lower. CEO protection and board monitoring appear to be alternative mechanisms in alleviating 
managerial myopia. In an untabulated analysis, we also find that the effect of CEO protection is 
                                                 
28 In an untabulated additional analysis, we examine another industry characteristic, the degree of competition. 
Giroud and Mueller (2010) find that competition in the product market can reduce managerial slack and myopia. It 
follows that the impact of CEO protection on managerial myopia should become smaller in more competitive 
industries. We find results consistent with this prediction.  
33 
 
stronger when CEO incentive compensation is lower, consistent with the view that CEO 
protection and incentive compensation are alternative ways of addressing short-termism (Rau 
and Xu 2013). 
The last column of Table 6 reports the regression results when all of the three conditional 
variables and their interactions with CEO protection are included. The results are similar.  
In sum, consistent with our hypotheses, the impact of CEO protection on managerial 
myopia is greater for firms in more homogeneous industries, for firms with higher transient 
institutional ownership, and for firms with lower board independence. These results suggest that 
the impact of CEO protection on managerial myopia is stronger when CEOs have stronger 
incentives to engage in myopic behavior and when the alternative mechanisms to curb myopic 
behavior are less effective.  
 
6. Alternative proxies for managerial short-termism 
6.1 The likelihood of cutting R&D and advertising expenditures 
Like R&D expenditures, advertising expenditures are also subject to managerial discretion 
and are expensed in the period when they occur. In this section, we use the likelihood of cutting 
total R&D and advertising expenditures as the proxy for managerial short-termism and examine 
whether our inferences still hold. The methodology is very similar to the main analyses except 
that we use the sum of R&D and advertising expenditures in place of R&D expenditures for 
sample selection and research design. For example, the small earnings decrease (SD) group 
refers to firm-years where there is a decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D & advertising earnings and 
the decrease is smaller than the prior year’s R&D and advertising expenditures.  
Table 7 reports the regression results for the SD group, first for H1and then for H2-H4. The 
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results are consistent with all the hypotheses. As reported in Column (1), the coefficient on the 
CEO protection indicator is significantly negative, indicating that firms with CEO contractual 
protection are less likely to cut R&D and advertising expenditures to meet earnings targets. The 
results in columns (2), (3), and (4) show that the coefficients on the interactions between the 
CEO protection indicator and the conditional variables are significantly negative, as predicted. 
The last column of the table shows that the results hold when all the conditional variables and the 
associated interactions are included at the same time. These results indicate that the negative 
impact of CEO contractual protection on the likelihood of cutting R&D and advertising 
expenditures is stronger for firms in more homogeneous industries, for firms with higher 
transient institutional ownership, and for firms with lower board independence.29 
6.2 Real earnings management as an alternative proxy for managerial short-termism 
In this section, we investigate how CEO contractual protection affects the extent of real 
earnings management, an alternative proxy for managerial short-termism. Following 
Roychowdhury (2006), we measure the extent of real earnings management using abnormal 
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenditures. Following Zang (2012), we combine 
these two measures to capture the overall extent of real earnings management (abnormal 
production costs minus abnormal discretionary expenditures, both scaled by lagged assets).30 As 
in Roychowdhury (2006), we focus on the suspect firm-years, those that meet or just beat 
earnings benchmarks, in order to increase the power of the tests. Compared to the non-suspect 
firm-years, the suspect firm-years are more likely to have engaged in real earnings management 
to meet short-term earnings targets. The earnings benchmarks here include zero, last year’s 
                                                 
29 As in the main analyses, we do not find any significant results for the variables of interest for the comparison 
groups. 
30 We do not use the abnormal level of operating cash flows in the analysis because both Roychowdhury (2006) and 
Zang (2012) argue that real earnings management activities have an ambiguous effect on operating cash flows.  
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earnings, and analysts’ consensus forecasts. 
We follow prior studies in choosing the control variables and run the following regression 
for the suspect firm-years: 
ܴ݈݁ܽ	ܧܯ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ_ܸܽݎ௜,௧ 
൅ߚଷܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൈ ܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ_ܸܽݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵܶ݋ܾ݅݊_ܳ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଶ∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ 
൅ߛଷܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛହܨܥܨ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଺ܴܱܣ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ 
൅ߛ଼ܥܧܱ_ܣ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଽܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ௜,௧൅ߛଵସܥܧܱ_ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ_ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ , (5) 
 
ܴ݈݁ܽ	ܧܯ measures the extent of real earnings management. The conditional variable, 
Conditional_Var, is one of the following three indicator variables: Industry_Homogeneity, 
Transient_Inst, and Low_Board_Independence, as in Section 5.4. Table 8 reports the regression 
results, first for H1 and then for H2-H4. The results are consistent with all the hypotheses. As 
reported in Column (1), the coefficient on the CEO protection indicator is significantly negative, 
indicating that firms with CEO contractual protection are less likely to engage in real earnings 
management. The results in columns (2), (3), (4), and (5) show that the coefficients on the 
interactions between the CEO protection indicator and the conditional variables are significantly 
negative, as predicted. These results indicate that the impact of CEO contractual protection on 
real earnings management is stronger for firms in more homogeneous industries, for firms with 
higher transient institutional ownership, and for firms with lower board independence.  
As expected, we do not find significant results on the variables of interest for the non-
suspect firm-years (untabulated). We also use an alternative research design – using the full 
sample of firm-years in the regressions and adding the interaction between the CEO protection 
indicator and the suspect firm indicator. This leads to the same inferences. We do not report the 
results using this alternative design because the model specifications for H2-H4 become very 
cumbersome under this design and because we want to use a similar research design as the 
analyses in Section 5. 
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In sum, the analyses of the likelihood of cutting R&D and advertising expenditures and the 
extent of real earnings management complement the main analyses and reinforce the inference 
that CEO contractual protection can mitigate managerial myopic behavior. 
 
7. Additional analyses to substantiate the assumptions and to address alternative 
explanations 
7.1 Does cutting R&D lead to poorer performance in the future for the SD group? 
As in prior research (e.g., Bushee 1998; Roychowdhury 2006), one of our maintained 
assumptions is that cutting R&D to achieve short-term earnings targets reduces long-run firm 
performance and is therefore a manifestation of managerial myopia. However, one might argue 
that cutting R&D in such situations can be an optimal decision. While the managerial myopia 
argument implies that within the small earnings decrease (SD) group, firms that cut R&D have 
poorer performance in the future than those that do not, the optimal decision argument does not 
imply such performance differences. To provide support for the myopia argument, we examine 
whether within the SD group, firms that cut R&D experience poorer performance in the future 
than those that do not cut R&D.  
Table 9 reports the regression results. The dependent variable is the average industry-
adjusted ROA (return on assets) or CFO (cash flows from operations scaled by lagged assets) in 
the next three years. The independent variables include an indicator for the small earnings 
decrease (SD) group, an indicator for cutting R&D in the SD group, and an indicator for cutting 
R&D in the other groups (i.e., the LD and IN groups). 31 The choice of the control variables 
(including the current year’s performance) follows prior research. Not surprisingly, the current 
                                                 
31 For simplicity we combine the LD and IN groups together for this analysis. Separating them leads to qualitatively 
similar results.  
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year’s performance is the most important determinant of performance in the future. With respect 
to the impact of cutting R&D on performance in the future, cutting R&D does not lead to poorer 
performance for firms in the other groups (p-value = 0.269 and 0.418, respectively, for analyses 
of future ROA and CFO), consistent with the notion that cutting R&D on average is not driven 
by opportunistic considerations in these groups. Consistent with the myopia argument, within the 
SD group, cutting R&D is associated with significantly poorer performance in the future; on 
average, firms that cut R&D experience a 0.7 (1.8) percentage point lower ROA (CFO) in the 
next three years than those that do not. F-tests (untabulated) indicate that the impact of cutting 
R&D on performance in the future is significantly different between the SD group and the other 
groups. The findings are consistent with our argument that cutting R&D to achieve short-term 
earnings targets hurts long-run performance and thus captures managerial myopia. 
7.2 Does CEO contractual protection reduce CEO turnover?  
Another key assumption underlying our argument is that CEO employment agreements and 
severance pay agreements protect CEOs from short-term performance swing and downside risk 
and thus reduce the likelihood of CEO turnovers upon poor short-term performance. While prior 
research provides supportive evidence for this assumption, in this section, we directly test 
whether CEO contractual protection reduces CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in our 
sample.  
For this purpose, we regress the likelihood of CEO turnover in the next year on the current 
year’s performance, its interaction with the CEO protection indicator, and control variables. The 
research design closely follows prior CEO turnover studies (e.g., Denis et al. 1997; Parrino 1997; 
DeFond and Park 1999). We measure performance in two ways: market-adjusted stock returns 
and industry-adjusted ROA. The results are reported in Table 10. We find that consistent with 
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prior research, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is significantly negative, implying that 
CEOs of firms experiencing poor performance are more likely to be replaced. More importantly, 
we find that the interaction between firm performance and the CEO protection indicator is 
significantly positive. That is, CEOs with contractual protection are less likely to be replaced 
after poor performance, compared to those without protection. This is consistent with our 
assumption that CEO contracts can protect CEOs from short-term performance swing.32 We also 
find that the main effect of CEO protection on CEO turnover is significantly negative.  
In an untabulated analysis, we use an indicator for earnings decrease as an alternative 
measure of firm performance. We find that firms with an earnings decrease are more likely to 
experience CEO turnover in the next year. However, this effect is significantly weaker in the 
presence of CEO contractual protection, again confirming our assumption.  
In sum, the above analyses substantiate the assumption that CEO employment agreements 
and severance pay agreements can protect CEOs from short-term performance swing, thus 
reducing CEOs’ incentives to engage in myopic behavior.  
7.3 Alternative explanation: differential investment opportunities 
One might argue that our results can be explained by differential investment opportunities: 
firms without CEO contractual protection have fewer investment opportunities than those with 
CEO contractual protection, and therefore the former are more likely to cut R&D than the latter. 
If this is the case, we should find similar results for the comparison groups. However, we do not 
find that firms without CEO protection are more likely to cut R&D than those with CEO 
protection within the comparison groups, inconsistent with this alternative explanation.  
Furthermore, we conduct an additional analysis to test this alternative explanation. Under 
                                                 
32 In an untabulated analysis, we separately examine CEO employment agreements and severance pay agreements 
and find that both reduce the likelihood of CEO turnover after poor performance. 
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the alternative explanation, firms without CEO protection have fewer investment opportunities 
and therefore they should be more likely to cut other long-term investments as well, such as 
capital expenditures (CAPX). However, unlike cutting R&D, cutting CAPX does not help 
improve reported earnings in the same period. Thus under the myopia argument, we do not 
expect firms with and without CEO protection to differ in the likelihood of cutting CAPX. For 
this test, we replace the indicator for cutting R&D in Equation (1) with an indicator for cutting 
CAPX and replicate the analysis. (The model specification remains the same except that we 
replace the change in CAPX on the right-hand side with the lagged change in CAPX.) The 
untabulated analysis indicates that the coefficient on the CEO protection indicator is insignificant 
across all the model specifications for the SD group. (The results are also insignificant for the 
comparison groups.) This finding indicates that our results on cutting R&D are unlikely to be 
driven by differential investment opportunities between firms with and without CEO protection.  
7.4 Alternative explanation: the quiet life story 
Another potential alternative explanation for our results is that CEOs with contractual 
protection enjoy a quiet life and do not bother to cut R&D. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) 
argue that without takeover pressure, CEOs will enjoy a quiet life by avoiding activities that 
involve “difficult decisions and costly efforts.” Consistent with this argument, Zhao and Chen 
(2008) find that firms with staggered boards, which reduce takeover pressure, are less likely to 
engage in accrual earnings management. One might argue that like CEOs without takeover 
pressure, CEOs with contractual protection enjoy a quiet life and do not undertake actions to cut 
R&D.  
There are several problems with this alternative explanation in our setting. First, in general, 
the findings in prior research are not consistent with CEOs with contractual protection enjoying a 
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quiet life. If anything, the implication is opposite. CEOs with contractual protection are shown to 
take on more risks (Huang 2010; Xu 2011). Second, the quiet life story should apply to the 
comparison groups as well, but we do not find similar results in the comparison groups. Lastly, 
not cutting R&D implies actively managing the current higher level of R&D activities and do not 
necessarily constitute a quiet life. Because of the above reasons, we do not believe that the quiet 
life story explains our results.  
 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment 
agreements and standalone severance pay agreements, helps reduce managerial short-termism. 
Managers have incentives to boost short-term performance to increase their welfare, potentially 
at the expense of long-term firm value. However, CEOs with contractual protection are protected 
from short-term performance swing and downside risk and as a result, such CEOs have weaker 
incentives to engage in myopic behavior.  
To test this prediction, we hand collect CEO employment agreement and severance pay 
agreement information from the proxy statements. Our main proxy for managerial myopia is 
cutting R&D to avoid earnings decreases. The sample includes 2,027 firm-years from S&P 500 
firms over the 1995-2008 period that have proxy statements and significant R&D expenditures. 
Our test group, the small earnings decrease (SD) group, includes firm-years where there is a 
decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings compared to the prior year but the decease is smaller 
than the prior year’s R&D. The incentive to cut R&D to avoid earnings declines is most salient 
in this group and hence we predict that CEO contractual protection can lower the likelihood of 
cutting R&D in the SD group. Other firm-years serve as the comparison groups. For the 
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comparison groups, firms do not have incentives to cut R&D to avoid earnings decreases 
because it is not feasible (for those with large earnings decreases) or necessary (for those with 
earnings increases); therefore we do not expect CEO protection to be associated with the 
likelihood of cutting R&D for the comparison groups.  
The results are consistent with our prediction. For the SD group, the impact of CEO 
contractual protection on the likelihood of cutting R&D is both statistically and economically 
significant. We also find that the impact of CEO contractual protection increases with the 
duration and monetary strength of the contractual protection. For the cross-sectional tests, we 
predict and find that the impact of CEO protection is greater for firms in more homogenous 
industries, for firms with higher transient institutional ownership, and for firms with lower board 
independence. These results indicate that the impact of CEO protection on managerial myopia is 
stronger when CEOs have stronger incentives to engage in myopic behavior or when alternative 
mechanisms to curb myopic behavior are weaker.  
With respect to the comparison groups, as expected, the impact of CEO contractual 
protection on the likelihood of cutting R&D is insignificant. This finding helps address the 
concern that the results for the SD group may be driven by omitted firm or CEO characteristics 
that are correlated with both the use of CEO contracts and R&D investments. 
In an additional test, we use the extent of real earnings management to proxy for 
managerial myopia and the inferences are the same. We also conduct analyses to substantiate our 
assumptions and to address alternative explanations. First, we find that within the SD group, 
cutting R&D is associated with poorer performance in the future, lending support to our 
argument that cutting R&D to achieve short-term earnings targets is a manifestation of 
managerial myopia. Second, we find that CEOs with contractual protection are less likely to be 
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replaced after poor performance, consistent with the notion that CEO contracts protect CEOs 
from short-term performance swing. Lastly, we conduct tests to rule out alternative explanations 
(such as differential investment opportunities or a quiet life story).  
Our paper contributes to the literature by examining how CEO contracts affect managerial 
short-termism. The findings suggest that CEO contractual protection reduces managers’ 
incentives to engage in myopic behavior. Therefore, our study complements prior studies that 
investigate how board monitoring and CEO equity incentives address managerial short-termism 
and advances an emerging literature that examines the impact of CEO contracts on corporate 
decisions.  
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Appendix A 
Variable measurements 
 
RD_Decreasei,t = indicator for cutting R&D, 1 if R&D decreases compared to the prior year, 
and 0 otherwise; 
CEO_Protectioni,t = indicator for CEO contractual protection, 1 if the CEO has an employment 
agreement or a severance pay agreement, and 0 otherwise;  
∆RDi,t-1  =  prior year’s change in R&D, calculated as the difference in the natural 
logarithm of R&D between the prior year and the year before;  
∆Ind_RDi,t = change in industry R&D intensity, calculated as the difference in the ratio 
of total industry R&D over total industry sales between the current year 
and the prior year, where the industry measures are based on all the firms 
with the same 4-digit SICs as firm i (excluding firm i); 
∆GDPi,t = change in GDP, calculated as the difference in the natural logarithm of 
GDP between the current year and the prior year; 
Tobin_Qi,t = Tobin’s Q, calculated as the sum of market value of common equity, book 
value of preferred stocks, and book value of debt divided by total assets;  
∆CAPXi,t = change in capital expenditures, calculated as the difference in the natural 
logarithm of capital expenditures between the current year and the prior 
year; 
∆Salesi,t = change in sales, calculated as the difference in the natural logarithm of 
sales between the current year and the prior year;  
Sizei,t = natural logarithm of market value of equity (in millions);  
Distance_Goali,t = distance from earnings goal, calculated as the difference in the pre-tax, 
pre-R&D earnings between the current year and the prior year, scaled by 
the prior year’s R&D; 
Leveragei,t = leverage, calculated as total debt divided by total assets; 
FCFi,t = free cash flows, calculated as cash flows from operations minus capital 
expenditures, scaled by total assets; 
INSTi,t = institutional ownership, measured as the percentage of outstanding shares 
held by institutional investors; 
CEO_Agei,t = indicator for CEOs who are close to retirement, 1 for CEOs who are 63 
and older and 0 otherwise;  
CEO_Equityi,t = CEO’s equity incentives, measured as CEO’s share and option holdings 
scaled by total number of shares outstanding;  
CEO_Abnormal_Compi,t = CEO’s abnormal cash compensation, measured as the residual from the 
regression of the natural logarithm of CEO cash compensation on the 
natural logarithm of firm assets, ROA, the market-to-book ratio, CEO 
tenure, and industry and year indicators (Gillan et al. 2009); 
i,t = firm i, year t subscripts.  
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TABLE 1  
Sample selection, composition and descriptive statistics  
	
This table reports the sample selection, composition, and descriptive statistics for our sample of 2,027 
firm-years from S&P 500 firms in the period 1995-2008.  
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
Restriction  Sample size
 
Firm-years with proxy statements available from EDGAR for S&P 500 
firms in the period 1995-2008   
 
6,973
 
Less:  
  
Firm-years with missing R&D data in the current year  3,119 
  
Firm-years with missing or insignificant R&D in the prior year 
(i.e., R&D/sales <1%) 1,169 
  
Firm-years without the data to calculate the regression variables 658 
  
Final sample  2,027
 
Panel B: Yearly distribution  
     Type of CEO protection 
 
 
Year 
 
# of  
obs. 
 
# of obs. with 
CEO protection 
Percentage of 
obs. with CEO 
protection 
 # of obs. with 
employment 
agreements 
# of obs. with 
standalone severance 
pay agreements 
1995 108 71 65.74%  30 41 
1996 122 75 61.48%  34 41 
1997 127 73 57.48%  32 41 
1998 141 87 61.70%  43 44 
1999 149 92 61.74%  52 40 
2000 150 102 68.00%  54 48 
2001 154 110 71.43%  63 47 
2002 154 112 72.73%  63 49 
2003 159 116 72.96%  60 56 
2004 158 117 74.05%  67 50 
2005 154 118 76.62%  67 51 
2006 149 117 78.52%  58 59 
2007 156 124 79.49%  58 66 
2008 146 115 78.77%  55 60 
 
Total 2,027 1,429 70.50%  736 693 
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TABLE 1 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics on firm characteristics: Separately for firm-years with and without CEO 
protection  
 
This panel reports descriptive statistics for our sample of 2,027 firm-years from S&P 500 firms in the 
period 1995-2008, separately for firm-years with and without CEO protection. Please see Appendix A for 
variable measurement. *, ** denote a significant difference in mean/median between firm-years with and 
without CEO protection at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
 
The sample with CEO protection 
 
 
      
Indicator for cutting R&D  1,429 0.365 0.482 0 0 1 
Prior year’s change in R&D   1,429 0.011 0.294 -0.079 0.054 0.148 
Change in industry R&D intensity   1,429 0.003 0.147 -0.070 -0.004 0.075 
Change in GDP   1,429 0.026 0.018 0.014 0.029 0.037 
Tobin’s Q   1,429 2.457 1.733 1.286 1.878 2.998 
Change in capital expenditures  1,429 -0.004 0.431 -0.119 0.010 0.127 
Change in sales   1,429 0.014 0.263 -0.017 0.033 0.083 
Firm size   1,429 8.906 1.146 8.011 8.818 9.626 
Distance from earnings goal   1,429 0.144 1.680 -0.658 0.304 0.982 
Leverage  1,429 0.210 0.143 0.100 0.208 0.301 
Free cash flows  1,429 0.280 0.212 0.157 0.262 0.391 
Institutional ownership  1429 0.709 0.157 0.625 0.732 0.820 
CEO age dummy  1,429 0.110 0.313 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CEO equity incentives  1,429 0.016 0.022 0.004 0.009 0.018 
CEO abnormal compensation  1,429 0.095 0.456 -0.192 0.101 0.389 
 
The sample without CEO protection 
 
 
      
Indicator for cutting R&D  598 0.426 0.495 0 0 1 
Prior year’s change in R&D   598 0.006 0.316 -0.113 0.055 0.154 
Change in industry R&D intensity   598 0.012 0.147 -0.060 0.000 0.080 
Change in GDP   598 0.030** 0.019 0.019 0.030** 0.040 
Tobin’s Q   598 3.190** 2.012 1.664 2.658** 4.019 
Change in capital expenditures   598 -0.014 0.460 -0.149 0.008 0.132 
Change in sales   598 -0.007 0.302 -0.059 0.030 0.087 
Firm size   598 9.526** 1.334 8.440 9.454** 10.573 
Distance from earnings goal   598 0.073 1.457 -0.630 0.221 0.831 
Leverage  598 0.188** 0.166 0.019 0.178** 0.296 
Free cash flows  598 0.301 0.217 0.178 0.307** 0.418 
Institutional ownership  598 0.638** 0.162 0.532 0.657** 0.761 
CEO age dummy  598 0.144 0.351 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CEO equity incentives  598 0.026** 0.056 0.003 0.007** 0.018 
CEO abnormal compensation  598 -0.102** 0.603 -0.315 0.021** 0.234 
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TABLE 1 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics on firm characteristics: Separately for the small earnings decrease (SD), 
large earnings decrease (LD), and earnings increase (IN) groups 
 
This panel reports descriptive statistics for our sample of 2,027 firm-years from S&P 500 firms in the 
period 1995-2008, separately for the three groups. The small earnings decrease (SD) group includes firm-
years where there is a decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings from the prior year to the current year 
and the decrease is smaller than the prior year’s R&D. The large earnings decrease (LD) group includes 
firm-years where there is a decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings from the prior year to the current 
year and the decrease is greater than the prior year’s R&D. The earnings increase (IN) group includes 
firm-years where there is an increase in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings from the prior year to the current 
year. The last two columns report the p-value for the differences in means between the SD and LD groups 
and between the SD and IN groups. Please see Appendix A for variable measurement.  
 
 Mean 
P-value for the difference 
in means 
 SD LD IN SD vs. LD SD vs. IN 
Indicator for cutting R&D 0.517 0.690 0.237 0.001 0.001 
Prior year’s change in R&D 0.038 0.024 -0.005 0.505 0.011 
Change in industry R&D intensity 0.013 0.023 -0.003 0.329 0.052 
Change in GDP 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.596 0.684 
Tobin’s Q 2.695 2.436 2.742 0.071 0.678 
Change in capital expenditures -0.063 -0.187 0.070 0.001 0.001 
Change in sales  -0.062 -0.202 0.100 0.001 0.001 
Firm size 9.061 8.987 9.132 0.399 0.309 
Distance from earnings goal -0.438 -2.317 1.104 0.001 0.001 
Leverage 0.190 0.228 0.200 0.001 0.198 
Free cash flows 0.245 0.242 0.315 0.835 0.001 
Institutional ownership 0.680 0.657 0.700 0.051 0.032 
CEO age dummy 0.123 0.132 0.115 0.707 0.658 
CEO equity incentives 0.022 0.019 0.018 0.215 0.023 
CEO abnormal compensation 0.003 -0.027 0.070  0.298 0.023 
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TABLE 2 
Determinants of the use of CEO contractual protection 
  
This table reports the results from probit regressions that explain the likelihood of a firm having CEO 
contractual protection (i.e., having an employment agreement or a standalone severance pay agreement 
with the CEO). The sample includes 2,977 firm-years from S&P 500 firms in the period 1995-2008. We 
require that the proxy statement is available from EDGAR and there is available data to calculate the 
regression variables. (The sample size is larger than in the main analyses because here we do not require 
that R&D is non-missing and of a significant amount in the current or prior year). The probit regressions 
are run by industry (based on Fama and French (1997) industry definitions). We report the average 
coefficients and marginal effects across the industries and the p-values based on the coefficient estimates 
across the industries. P-values are one-sided for variables with predicted signs and two-sided otherwise. 
The marginal effect is calculated as the change in the probability of having CEO contractual protection, 
when there is a change of one standard deviation in the continuous explanatory variables (or a change 
from 0 to 1 in the indicator variables), with other explanatory variables taking the value of the sample 
means. The variables are measured as follows: 
	
Public policy = 1 for firms with headquarters in the states that have a public policy 
exception to employment at will , and 0 otherwise; 
Implied contract = 1 for firms with headquarters in the states that have an implied contract 
exception to employment at will, and 0 otherwise; 
Good faith and fair dealing = 1 for firms with headquarters in the states that have a good faith and fair 
dealing exception to employment at will, and 0 otherwise; 
Anti-takeover regulations = 1 for firms with headquarters in the states that have business combination 
laws (Bertrand and Mullainathan 1999), and 0 otherwise; 
Garmaise index = the state level enforcement index of non-competition agreements as 
constructed by Garmaise (2011); 
R&D Intensity = R&D expenditures divided by sales, and set as zero for missing values;  
Market-to-book ratio = market value of equity divided by book value of equity; 
Market-adjusted returns = market-adjusted cumulative stock returns over the year;  
ROA = return on assets, measured as net income over total assets; 
Outside CEO = 1 if the CEO was appointed to the CEO position within one year after 
joining the firm, and 0 otherwise; 
Old CEO = 1 if the CEO is 63 years or older, and 0 otherwise; 
Abnormal compensation = abnormal CEO cash compensation, measured as the residual from a 
model that regresses the logarithm of CEO cash compensation on the 
logarithm of firm assets, ROA, the market-to-book ratio, CEO tenure, 
and industry and year indicators, as in Gillan et al. (2009); 
Incentive-based compensation = the ratio of the value of the CEO’s stock and option grants to the CEO’s 
total compensation; 
Board independence = 1 if the percentage of independent directors sitting on the board is higher 
than sample median, and 0 otherwise;  
Founder CEO = 1 if the CEO is one of the founders of the firm, and 0 otherwise;  
Leverage = total debt divided by total assets; 
Assets = logarithm of total assets (in millions); 
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TABLE 2 (Cont’d)  
   (1)  (2)   (3)  
 
Pred. 
signs Coef. P-value  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value 
Average 
marginal effect  
Intercept  -0.268 0.770  6.988 0.109   18.864 0.028   
State policy variables             
Public policy – -0.110 0.436      1.602 0.917 0.088  
Implied contract – -0.851 0.043      -2.356 0.015 -0.142  
Good faith and fair dealing – -1.693 0.011      -2.623 0.022 -0.159  
Anti-takeover regulations – -1.352 0.016      -1.031 0.048 -0.076  
Garmaise index – -0.597 0.001      -0.607 0.063 -0.051  
Firm and CEO characteristics             
R&D intensity +  10.104 0.113   9.091 0.040 0.068  
Market-to-book ratio +  1.618 0.159   2.530 0.179 0.044  
Market-adjusted returns –  0.277 0.569   0.961 0.862 0.030  
ROA –    -14.862 0.091   -17.790 0.025 -0.085  
Outside CEO +    -0.645 0.475   -1.130 0.871 -0.080  
Old CEO –  -1.496 0.004   -2.556 0.005 -0.152  
Abnormal compensation +  3.061 0.007   2.788 0.001 0.094  
Incentive-based compensation +  2.981 0.015   2.528 0.014 0.076  
Board independence –    -0.554 0.104   -0.857 0.028 -0.066  
Founder CEO –  -3.318 0.001   -2.697 0.001 -0.177  
Leverage ?  0.653 0.696   2.909 0.115 0.041  
Assets ?  -0.860 0.046   -0.820 0.205 -0.036  
             
# of observations  2,977   2,977    2,977    
# of industries  30   30    30    
Average pseudo R2  0.368   0.491    0.595    
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TABLE 3 
CEO contractual protection and managerial short-termism – Univariate analysis  
 
The sample includes 2,027 firm-years from S&P 500 firms over the period 1995-2008. CEO protection 
refers to CEO contracts in the form of employment agreements or severance pay agreements. The sample 
is split into three groups. The small earnings decrease (SD) group is the test group. It includes firm-years 
where there is a decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings from the prior year to the current year and the 
decrease is smaller than the prior year’s R&D. The comparison groups include the large earnings decrease 
(LD) group and the earnings increase (IN) group. The LD group includes firm-years where there is a 
decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings from the prior year to the current year and the decrease is 
greater than the prior year’s R&D. The IN group includes firm-years where there is an increase in the pre-
tax, pre-R&D earnings from the prior year to the current year.  
 
Panel A: The test group: the small earnings decrease (SD) group (N=431) 
Without CEO 
protection 
With CEO 
protection Total 
Cut R&D 97 126 223 
(% of firms cutting R&D) (65%) (45%) (52%) 
Increase R&D 52 156 208 
(% of firms increasing R&D) (35%) (55%) (48%) 
 
P-value of Chi-square test 0.001  
 
Panel B: The comparison groups 
Without CEO 
protection 
With CEO 
protection Total 
 
The large earnings decrease (LD) group (N=387) 
Cut R&D 75 192 267 
(% of firms cutting R&D) (71%) (68%) (69%) 
Increase R&D 31 89 120 
(% of firms increasing R&D) (29%) (32%) (31%) 
 
P-value of Chi-square test 0.645  
 
The earnings increase (IN) group (N=1,209) 
Cut R&D 83 204 287 
(% of firms cutting R&D) (24%) (24%) (24%) 
Increase R&D 260 662 922 
(% of firms increasing R&D) (76%) (76%) (76%) 
 
P-value of Chi-square test 0.813  
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TABLE 4 
CEO contractual protection and managerial short-termism – Regression analyses 
 
The sample includes 2,027 firm-years from S&P 500 firms over the period 1995-2008. CEO protection refers to CEO contracts in the form of 
employment agreements or severance pay agreements. The sample is split into three groups. The small earnings decrease (SD) group is the test 
group. It includes firm-years where there is a decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings from the prior year to the current year and the decrease is 
smaller than the prior year’s R&D. The comparison groups include the large earnings decrease (LD) group and the earnings increase (IN) group. 
The LD group includes firm-years where there is a decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings from the prior year to the current year and the 
decrease is greater than the prior year’s R&D. The IN group includes firm-years where there is an increase in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings from 
the prior year to the current year. The following probit regression is run separately for the three groups: 
 
ܲݎ݋ܾሺܴܦ_ܦ݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁௜,௧ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ∆ܴܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଶ∆ܫ݊݀_ܴܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷ∆ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߛସܶ݋ܾ݅݊_ܳ௜,௧ ൅ ߛହ∆ܥܣܲ ௜ܺ,௧ 
൅ߛ଺∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଼ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁_ܩ݋݈ܽ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଽܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܨܥܨ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଵܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ ൅ ߛଵଶܥܧܱ_ܣ݃݁௜,௧ ൅
ߛଵଷܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ௜,௧൅ߛଵସܥܧܱ_ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ_ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ ,      (1) 
 
where RD_Decrease is an indicator for cutting R&D; it is 1 if the firm cuts R&D compared to the prior year and 0 otherwise. CEO_Protection is 
an indicator for CEO contractual protection; it is 1 if the CEO has an employment agreement or a severance pay agreement and 0 otherwise. See 
Appendix A for the measurement of the control variables. The results for the test group, the SD group, are reported in Panel A. The results for the 
comparison groups, the LD and IN groups, are reported in Panel B. To save space, the results on the control variables are omitted from Panel B. 
For each panel, in column (1), we report the probit regression results. In column (2), we replace CEO_Protection with its predicted value from the 
first-stage regression. In column (3), we add to the regressions the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the first-stage regression. See Table 2, 
Column (3) for details on the first-stage regression. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. The p-values 
are one-sided for CEO_Protection in Panel A and two-sided otherwise. The marginal effect is calculated as the change in the probability of cutting 
R&D, when there is a change of one standard deviation in the continuous explanatory variables (or a change from 0 to 1 in the indicator variables), 
with other explanatory variables taking the value of the sample means.  
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TABLE 4 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel A: The test group: the small earnings decrease (SD) group 
  
(1) 
 
 
Probit regression  
(2) 
Two-stage regression 
(using the predicted value of 
CEO protection)  
(3) 
 
Two-stage regression 
(using the Heckman approach) 
 Coef. P-value 
Marginal 
effect  Coef. P-value 
Marginal 
effect  Coef. P-value 
Marginal 
effect 
Intercept  0.984 0.236  1.464 0.077   1.502 0.070  
CEO_Protection  -0.527 0.001 -0.204  -0.554 0.001 -0.217  -0.638 0.001 -0.246 
Prior year’s change in R&D  0.789 0.001 0.096  0.880 0.001 0.108  0.854 0.001 0.105 
Change in industry R&D intensity  -0.754 0.130 -0.043  -0.752 0.148 -0.043  -0.727 0.167 -0.042 
Change in GDP  -3.345 0.373 -0.025  -3.371 0.404 -0.025  -3.566 0.375 -0.027 
Tobin’s Q  0.071 0.094 0.060  0.055 0.232 0.045  0.057 0.217 0.047 
Change in capital expenditures  -0.466 0.009 -0.077  -0.470 0.013 -0.077  -0.463 0.015 -0.076 
Change in sales  -0.796 0.001 -0.162  -0.833 0.001 -0.171  -0.802 0.001 -0.165 
Firm size  -0.094 0.142 -0.046  -0.109 0.096 -0.054  -0.114 0.078 -0.057 
Distance from earnings goal  -0.036 0.879 -0.004  -0.021 0.936 -0.002  -0.031 0.904 -0.004 
Leverage  0.120 0.804 0.007  -0.358 0.472 -0.022  -0.309 0.535 -0.019 
Free cash flows  0.110 0.764 0.009  0.255 0.515 0.020  0.277 0.479 0.022 
Institutional ownership  0.068 0.889 0.005  -0.381 0.466 -0.026  -0.294 0.567 -0.020 
CEO age dummy  0.525 0.020 0.197  0.484 0.037 0.184  0.479 0.038 0.182 
CEO equity incentives  -4.726 0.022 -0.071  -4.148 0.041 -0.058  -4.168 0.038 -0.059 
CEO abnormal compensation  -0.344 0.076 -0.053  -0.353 0.095 -0.055  -0.373 0.075 -0.058 
Inverse Mills Ratio          0.240 0.144 0.048 
 
N  431  385    385   
Pseudo R2  0.165  0.163    0.168   
 
  
55 
 
TABLE 4 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: The comparison groups 
 
  
(1) 
 
 
Probit regression  
(2) 
Two-stage regression 
(using the predicted value of 
CEO protection)  
(3) 
 
Two-stage regression 
(using the Heckman approach) 
 Coef. P-value 
Marginal 
effect  Coef. P-value 
Marginal 
effect  Coef. P-value 
Marginal 
effect 
 
The large earnings decrease (LD) group 
CEO_Protection  -0.229 0.198 -0.067  -0.092 0.659 -0.027  -0.118 0.570 -0.034 
Inverse Mills Ratio          Yes   
Control variables  Yes    Yes    Yes   
N  387  335    335   
Pseudo R2  0.344  0.348    0.356   
 
The earnings increase (IN) group 
CEO_Protection  -0.129 0.211 -0.039  -0.052 0.676 -0.015  -0.073 0.561 -0.021 
Inverse Mills Ratio        Yes   
Control variables  Yes    Yes    Yes   
N  1,209  1,041    1,041   
Pseudo R2  0.104  0.103    0.105   
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TABLE 5 
CEO contractual protection and managerial short-termism –  
The incremental effect of the duration and strength of CEO protection for the small earnings decrease (SD) group 
 
The sample includes 2,027 firm-years from S&P 500 firms over the period 1995-2008. CEO protection refers to CEO contracts in the form of 
employment agreements or severance pay agreements. The sample is split into three groups. The small earnings decrease (SD) group is the test 
group. It includes firm-years where there is a decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings from the prior year to the current year and the decrease is 
smaller than the prior year’s R&D. The comparison groups include the large earnings decrease (LD) group and the earnings increase (IN) group. 
The results for the comparison groups are omitted to save space. The following probit regressions are estimated: 
ܲݎ݋ܾሺܴܦ_ܦ݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁௜,௧ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊0௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊1௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊2௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ∆ܴܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଶ∆ܫ݊݀_ܴܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷ∆ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅
ߛସܶ݋ܾ݅݊_ܳ௜,௧ ൅ ߛହ∆ܥܣܲ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߛ଺∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଼ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁_ܩ݋݈ܽ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଽܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܨܥܨ௜,௧ ൅
ߛଵଵܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ ൅ ߛଵଶܥܧܱ_ܣ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଷܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ௜,௧൅ߛଵସܥܧܱ_ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ_ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,   (2a) 
 
ܲݎ݋ܾሺܴܦ_ܦ݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁௜,௧ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܵݐݎ݁݊݃ݐ݄௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ∆ܴܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଶ∆ܫ݊݀_ܴܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷ∆ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߛସܶ݋ܾ݅݊_ܳ௜,௧ ൅
ߛହ∆ܥܣܲ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߛ଺∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଼ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁_ܩ݋݈ܽ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଽܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܨܥܨ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଵܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ ൅
ߛଵଶܥܧܱ_ܣ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଷܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ௜,௧൅ߛଵସܥܧܱ_ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ_ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,     (2b) 
 
where RD_Decrease is an indicator for cutting R&D; it is 1 if the firm cuts R&D compared to the prior year and 0 otherwise. In regression (2a), 
there are three indicator variables related to the duration of CEO protection. Duration2 is 1 for CEOs with standalone severance pay agreements or 
CEOs with automatically renewable employment agreements, and 0 otherwise. Duration1 is 1 for CEOs in the earlier stage of employment 
agreements without an automatic renewal clause, and 0 otherwise. Duration0 is 1 for CEOs in the later stage of employment agreements without 
an automatic renewal clause, and 0 otherwise. Duration2, Duration1, and Duration0 are zero for CEOs without contractual protection. In 
regression (2b), CEO_Protection is an indicator for CEO contractual protection; it is 1 if the CEO has an employment agreement or a severance 
pay agreement, and 0 otherwise. Strength is an ordinal variable for the strength of the protection; it is 2 if the severance pay multiple – how many 
times the severance pay is relative to the basic salary – is above three, 1 if the multiple is between two and three, and 0 if the multiple is below 
two. CEO_Protection and Strength are zero for CEOs without contractual protection. Firm-years with CEO contractual protection but without 
information on severance pay are excluded from regression (2b). See Appendix A for the measurement of control variables. We add to the 
regressions the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first-stage regression. See Table 2, Column (3) for details on the first-stage regression. The p-values 
are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and the duration and strength 
variables, and two-sided otherwise. The marginal effect is calculated as the change in the probability of cutting R&D, when there is a change of 
one standard deviation in the continuous explanatory variables (or a change from 0 to 1 in the indicator variables), with other explanatory variables 
taking the value of the sample means.  
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TABLE 5 (Cont’d) 
 
(1) 
Duration of CEO protection  
(2) 
Strength of CEO protection 
Coef. P-value Marginal effect  Coef. P-value Marginal effect 
Intercept 1.453 0.085  1.524 0.086  
Protection_Level: Duration0 -0.271 0.149 -0.108     
Protection_Level: Duration1 -0.696 0.003 -0.269     
Protection_Level: Duration2 -0.697 0.001 -0.272     
CEO_Protection     -0.457 0.013 -0.179 
Protection_Level: Strength     -0.199 0.056 -0.062 
Prior year’s change in R&D 0.820 0.001 0.101  0.960 0.001 0.118 
Change in industry R&D intensity -0.796 0.131 -0.046  -0.687 0.173 -0.040 
Change in GDP -3.430 0.391 -0.026  -5.145 0.236 -0.038 
Tobin’s Q 0.062 0.192 0.051  0.033 0.512 0.027 
Change in capital expenditures -0.463 0.018 -0.076  -0.384 0.069 -0.063 
Change in sales -0.822 0.001 -0.169  -0.807 0.001 -0.171 
Firm size -0.117 0.076 -0.058  -0.109 0.118 -0.055 
Distance from earnings goal -0.073 0.775 -0.009  0.080 0.778 0.009 
Leverage -0.263 0.605 -0.016  -0.430 0.425 -0.027 
Free cash flows 0.308 0.439 0.025  0.306 0.462 0.025 
Institutional ownership -0.263 0.619 -0.018  -0.164 0.765 -0.011 
CEO age dummy 0.449 0.055 0.172  0.508 0.034 0.191 
CEO equity incentives -4.222 0.042 -0.059  -3.281 0.091 -0.049 
CEO abnormal compensation -0.345 0.108 -0.053  -0.397 0.073 -0.061 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.223 0.175 0.044  0.211 0.249 0.041 
N 385  338   
Pseudo R2 0.169  0.175   
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TABLE 6 
CEO contractual protection and managerial short-termism –  
Cross-sectional tests for the small earnings decrease (SD) group  
 
The sample includes 2,027 firm-years from S&P 500 firms over the period 1995-2008. CEO protection refers to CEO contracts in the form of 
employment agreements or severance pay agreements. The sample is split into three groups. The small earnings decrease (SD) group is the test 
group. It includes firm-years where there is a decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings from the prior year to the current year and the decrease is 
smaller than the prior year’s R&D. The comparison groups include the large earnings decrease (LD) group and the earnings increase (IN) group. 
The results for the comparison groups are omitted to save space. The following probit regression is run: 
 
ܲݎ݋ܾሺܴܦ_ܦ݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁௜,௧ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ_ܸܽݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൈ ܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ_ܸܽݎ௜,௧ 
൅ߛଵ∆ܴܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଶ∆ܫ݊݀_ܴܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷ∆ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߛସܶ݋ܾ݅݊_ܳ௜,௧ ൅ ߛହ∆ܥܣܲ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߛ଺∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ 
൅ߛ଼ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁_ܩ݋݈ܽ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଽܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܨܥܨ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଵܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ ൅
ߛଵଶܥܧܱ_ܣ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଷܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ௜,௧൅ߛଵସܥܧܱ_ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ_ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ ,    (3) 
 
where RD_Decrease is an indicator for cutting R&D; it is 1 if the firm cuts R&D compared to the prior year and 0 otherwise. CEO_Protection is 
an indicator for CEO contractual protection; it is 1 if the CEO has an employment agreement or a severance pay agreement and 0 otherwise. 
Conditional_Var is one of the following three indicator variables: Industry_Homogeneity, Transient_Inst, and Low_Board_Independence. 
Industry_Homogeneity is 1 if the firm operates in an industry that is more homogeneous than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. For each firm in 
the industry (based on two-digit SICs), we first calculate the percentage of the variation in monthly stock returns that is explained by an equal-
weighted industry index over the previous ten years. We then measure industry homogeneity as the median across all firms in the industry. 
Transient_Inst is 1 if the ownership of transient institutional investors in the firm is higher than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
Low_Board_Independence is 1 if less than 75% of the directors (sample median) are independent, and 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for the 
measurement of control variables. We add to the regressions the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first-stage regression. See Table 2, Column (3) for 
details on the first-stage regression. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. The p-values are one-sided for 
CEO_Protection, the conditional variables, the interaction terms, and two-sided otherwise. The marginal effect is calculated as the change in the 
probability of cutting R&D, when there is a change of one standard deviation in the continuous explanatory variables (or a change from 0 to 1 in 
the indicator variables), with other explanatory variables taking the value of the sample means. The calculation of the marginal effect for the 
interaction terms follows Norton et al. (2004).  
  
59 
 
TABLE 6 (Cont’d) 
(1) 
Industry Homogeneity  
(2) 
Transient Inst. Ownership  
(3) 
Low Board Independence  
(4) 
All included 
Coef. 
P-
value 
Marginal 
effect  Coef. 
P-
value 
Marginal 
effect  Coef. 
P-
value 
Marginal 
effect  Coef. 
P-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
Intercept 1.438 0.087  1.196 0.158   0.956 0.268   0.559 0.538  
CEO_Protection -0.342 0.048 -0.134  -0.390 0.049 -0.153  -0.293 0.123 -0.115  0.335 0.837 0.133 
CEO_Protection × 
Industry_Homogeneity -0.744 0.004 -0.290          -0.857 0.002 -0.331 
CEO_Protection × Transient_Inst     -0.534 0.028 -0.211      -0.501 0.037 -0.198 
CEO_Protection × 
Low_Board_Independence         -0.633 0.019 -0.248  -0.732 0.013 -0.285 
Industry_Homogeneity 0.556 0.012 0.218          0.644 0.006 0.250 
Transient_Inst     0.423 0.052 0.167      0.385 0.071 0.152 
Low_Board_Independence         0.562 0.015 0.220  0.645 0.010 0.251 
Prior year’s change in R&D 0.936 0.001 0.115  0.826 0.001 0.101  0.818 0.001 0.100  0.887 0.001 0.109 
Change in industry R&D intensity -0.648 0.231 -0.037  -0.730 0.168 -0.042  -0.813 0.114 -0.047  -0.750 0.157 -0.043 
Change in GDP -2.271 0.578 -0.017  -4.248 0.288 -0.032  -3.894 0.340 -0.029  -3.165 0.444 -0.024 
Tobin’s Q 0.062 0.174 0.051  0.045 0.356 0.037  0.062 0.204 0.051  0.060 0.240 0.049 
Change in capital expenditures -0.457 0.017 -0.075  -0.471 0.012 -0.077  -0.439 0.021 -0.072  -0.442 0.021 -0.073 
Change in sales -0.791 0.001 -0.163  -0.774 0.001 -0.159  -0.799 0.001 -0.164  -0.762 0.001 -0.157 
Firm size -0.133 0.041 -0.066  -0.098 0.141 -0.049  -0.102 0.120 -0.051  -0.111 0.096 -0.055 
Distance from earnings goal -0.025 0.923 -0.003  -0.054 0.835 -0.006  -0.018 0.944 -0.002  -0.030 0.910 -0.004 
Leverage -0.332 0.523 -0.020  -0.327 0.526 -0.020  -0.204 0.681 -0.012  -0.255 0.634 -0.015 
Free cash flows 0.223 0.568 0.018  0.286 0.473 0.023  0.217 0.585 0.017  0.148 0.714 0.012 
Institutional ownership -0.314 0.550 -0.021  -0.293 0.575 -0.020  -0.123 0.814 -0.008  -0.120 0.824 -0.008 
CEO age dummy 0.484 0.034 0.184  0.416 0.074 0.159  0.445 0.058 0.170  0.386 0.097 0.148 
CEO equity incentives -4.762 0.018 -0.067  -3.757 0.088 -0.053  -4.375 0.028 -0.061  -4.666 0.025 -0.065 
CEO abnormal compensation -0.404 0.056 -0.063  -0.402 0.063 -0.062  -0.402 0.056 -0.062  -0.478 0.030 -0.074 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.299 0.074 0.059  0.232 0.163 0.046  0.250 0.135 0.050  0.311 0.073 0.061 
N 385  385    385    385   
Pseudo R2 0.179  0.174    0.177    0.196   
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TABLE 7  
CEO contractual protection and managerial short-termism –  
Analysis of cutting R&D and advertising expenditures  
  
The sample includes 2,782 firm-years from S&P 500 firms over the period 1995-2008. CEO protection refers to CEO contracts in the form of 
employment agreements or severance pay agreements. The sample is split into three groups. The small earnings decrease (SD) group is the test 
group. It includes 488 firm-years where there is a decrease in the pre-tax, pre-R&D & advertising earnings from the prior year to the current year 
and the decrease is smaller than the prior year’s R&D and advertising expenditures. The comparison groups include the large earnings decrease 
group and the earnings increase group. The results for the comparison groups are omitted to save space. The following probit regression is 
estimated: 
ܲݎ݋ܾሺܴܦ&ܣܦ_ܦ݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁௜,௧ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ_ܸܽݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൈ ܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ_ܸܽݎ௜,௧ 
൅ߛଵ∆ܴܦ&ܣܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଶ∆ܫ݊݀_ܴܦ&ܣܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷ∆ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߛସܶ݋ܾ݅݊_ܳ௜,௧ ൅ ߛହ∆ܥܣܲ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߛ଺∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ 
൅ߛ଼ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁_ܩ݋݈ܽ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଽܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܨܥܨ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଵܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ ൅
ߛଵଶܥܧܱ_ܣ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଷܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ௜,௧൅ߛଵସܥܧܱ_ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ_ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ ,    (4) 
 
where RD&AD_Decrease is an indicator for cutting the R&D and advertising expenditures; it is 1 if the firm cuts R&D and advertising 
expenditures compared to the prior year and 0 otherwise. CEO_Protection is an indicator for CEO contractual protection; it is 1 if the CEO has an 
employment agreement or a severance pay agreement and 0 otherwise. Conditional_Var is one of the following three indicator variables: 
Industry_Homogeneity, Transient_Inst, and Low_Board_Independence. Industry_Homogeneity is 1 if the firm operates in an industry that is more 
homogeneous than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. For each firm in the industry (based on two-digit SICs), we first calculate the percentage 
of the variation in monthly stock returns that is explained by an equal-weighted industry index over the previous ten years. We then measure 
industry homogeneity as the median across all firms in the industry. Transient_Inst is 1 if the ownership of transient institutional investors in the 
firm is higher than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Low_Board_Independence is 1 if less than 75% of the directors (sample median) are 
independent, and 0 otherwise.  See Appendix A for the measurement of control variables, except the following three variables.  
∆RD&ADi,t-1  =  prior year’s change in R&D and advertising expenditures, calculated as the difference in the natural logarithm of 
R&D and advertising expenditures between the prior year and the year before;  
∆Ind_RD&ADi,t  = change in industry R&D and advertising intensity, calculated as the difference in the ratio of total industry R&D and 
advertising expenditures over total industry sales between the current year and the prior year, where the industry 
measures are based on all the firms in the same 4-digit SIC industry as firm i (excluding firm i); 
Distance_Goali,t  = distance from earnings goal, calculated as the difference in the pre-tax, pre-R&D & advertising earnings between the 
current year and the prior year, scaled by the prior year’s R&D and advertising expenditures. 
We add to the regressions the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first-stage regression. See Table 2, Column (3) for detail on the first-stage regression. 
The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection, the conditional 
variables, the interaction terms, and two-sided otherwise.  
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TABLE 7 (Cont’d) 
 
(1) 
Test of H1  
(2) 
Test of H2  
(3) 
Test of H3  
(4) 
Test of H4  
(5) 
The full model 
Coef. P-value  Coef. P-value  Coef. P-value  Coef. P-value  Coef. P-value 
Intercept -0.269 0.731  -0.464 0.541  -0.731 0.364  -0.589 0.465  -1.132 0.177 
CEO_Protection -0.396 0.009  -0.190 0.178  -0.144 0.249  -0.074 0.380  0.407 0.898 
CEO_Protection × Industry_Homogeneity    -0.461 0.058        -0.543 0.032 
CEO_Protection × Transient_Inst       -0.441 0.048     -0.472 0.045 
CEO_Protection × 
Low_Board_Independence          -0.529 0.038  -0.534 0.047 
Industry_Homogeneity    0.607 0.012        0.669 0.006 
Transient_Inst       0.487 0.014     0.503 0.018 
Low_Board_Independence          0.388 0.065  0.402 0.076 
Prior year’s change in R&D and advertising 0.739 0.035  0.622 0.056  0.478 0.153  0.561 0.087  0.543 0.107 
Change in industry R&D and advertising 
intensity 0.010 0.979  -0.084 0.825  -0.044 0.907  -0.053 0.886  -0.075 0.842 
Change in GDP 4.284 0.193  7.120 0.036  4.405 0.177  5.011 0.132  7.041 0.038 
Tobin’s Q -0.113 0.037  -0.135 0.007  -0.147 0.007  -0.139 0.010  -0.148 0.005 
Change in capital expenditures -0.465 0.023  -0.481 0.007  -0.452 0.010  -0.451 0.010  -0.470 0.009 
Change in sales -2.333 0.001  -0.641 0.015  -0.695 0.009  -0.658 0.014  -0.618 0.018 
Firm size 0.051 0.408  0.047 0.441  0.080 0.206  0.064 0.305  0.061 0.337 
Distance from earnings goal 0.102 0.655  0.084 0.719  0.118 0.608  0.094 0.681  0.101 0.669 
Leverage 0.034 0.939  -0.066 0.880  -0.104 0.816  -0.156 0.724  -0.024 0.956 
Free cash flows 0.555 0.073  0.649 0.030  0.662 0.026  0.577 0.065  0.646 0.032 
Institutional ownership 0.140 0.729  0.088 0.832  0.219 0.592  0.200 0.624  0.116 0.781 
CEO age dummy 0.507 0.013  0.501 0.013  0.507 0.017  0.515 0.014  0.489 0.020 
CEO equity incentives -4.841 0.010  -5.256 0.022  -4.605 0.008  -5.147 0.008  -5.697 0.011 
CEO abnormal compensation -0.192 0.138  -0.185 0.149  -0.235 0.073  -0.226 0.086  -0.229 0.087 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.021 0.895  -0.070 0.670  -0.097 0.543  -0.080 0.616  -0.063 0.704 
N 488   488  488   488   488  
Pseudo R2 0.113   0.113  0.119   0.118   0.126  
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TABLE 8  
CEO contractual protection and managerial short-termism –  
Analysis of real earnings management for the suspect firm-years  
  
The sample includes 719 firm-years from S&P 500 firms over the period 1995-2008 that have required data and meet or just beat earnings 
benchmarks (i.e., zero, last year’s earnings, or analysts’ consensus forecasts). CEO protection refers to CEO contracts in the form of employment 
agreements or severance pay agreements. The following OLS regression is estimated: 
 
ܴ݈݁ܽ	ܧܯ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ_ܸܽݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൈ ܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ_ܸܽݎ௜,௧ 
൅ߛଵܶ݋ܾ݅݊_ܳ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଶ∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛହܨܥܨ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଺ܴܱܣ௜,௧ ൅ 
	൅ߛ଻ܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ ൅ ߛ଼ܥܧܱ_ܣ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߛଽܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܥܧܱ_ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ_ܥ݋݉௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ ,   (5) 
 
where Real_EM is the extent of real earnings management; it is measured as abnormal production costs minus abnormal discretionary 
expenditures, both scaled by lagged assets. CEO_Protection is an indicator for CEO contractual protection; it is 1 if the CEO has an employment 
agreement or a severance pay agreement and 0 otherwise. Conditional_Var is one of the following three indicator variables: 
Industry_Homogeneity, Transient_Inst, and Low_Board_Independence. Industry_Homogeneity is 1 if the firm operates in an industry that is more 
homogeneous than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. For each firm in the industry (based on two-digit SICs), we first calculate the percentage 
of the variation in monthly stock returns that is explained by an equal-weighted industry index over the previous ten years. We then measure 
industry homogeneity as the median across all firms in the industry. Transient_Inst is 1 if the ownership of transient institutional investors in the 
firm is higher than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Low_Board_Independence is 1 if less than 75% of the directors (sample median) are 
independent, and 0 otherwise.  ROA, return on assets, is measured as operating income divided by total assets. See Appendix A for the 
measurement of the other control variables. We add to the regressions the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first-stage regression. See Table 2, Column 
(3) for detail on the first-stage regression. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. The p-values are one-
sided for CEO_Protection, the conditional variables, the interaction terms, and two-sided otherwise.   
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TABLE 8 (Cont’d) 
 
  
(1) 
Test of H1  
(2) 
Test of H2  
(3) 
Test of H3  
(4) 
Test of H4  
(5) 
The full model 
 Coef. 
P-
value  Coef. 
P-
value  Coef. 
P-
value  Coef. 
P-
value  Coef. 
P-
value 
Intercept  0.237 0.132  0.195 0.182  0.157 0.294  0.225 0.176  0.103 0.511 
CEO_Protection  -0.088 0.013  -0.017 0.346  -0.044 0.147  -0.044 0.131  0.076 0.905 
CEO_Protection × 
Industry_Homogeneity     -0.169 0.004        -0.142 0.007 
CEO_Protection × 
Transient_Inst        -0.141 0.018     -0.143 0.014 
CEO_Protection × 
Low_Board_Independence           -0.122 0.019  -0.143 0.006 
Industry_Homogeneity     0.133 0.005        0.094 0.018 
Transient_Inst        0.157 0.002     0.156 0.001 
Low_Board_Independence           0.072 0.072  0.086 0.035 
Tobin’s Q  -0.064 0.001  -0.061 0.001  -0.066 0.001  -0.063 0.001  -0.063 0.001 
Change in sales  -0.071 0.122  -0.084 0.069  -0.066 0.157  -0.071 0.134  -0.074 0.121 
Firm size  0.016 0.351  0.012 0.493  0.022 0.207  0.012 0.491  0.015 0.399 
Leverage  -0.187 0.205  -0.154 0.302  -0.176 0.229  -0.145 0.337  -0.120 0.435 
Free cash flows  -0.035 0.259  -0.025 0.421  -0.028 0.358  -0.044 0.171  -0.031 0.311 
ROA  -1.228 0.001  -1.225 0.001  -1.260 0.001  -1.102 0.001  -1.139 0.001 
Institutional ownership  -0.034 0.693  -0.028 0.737  -0.075 0.394  -0.036 0.676  -0.063 0.458 
CEO age dummy  0.121 0.015  0.117 0.013  0.105 0.026  0.106 0.028  0.089 0.051 
CEO equity incentives  -0.381 0.492  -0.535 0.325  -0.298 0.588  -0.316 0.555  -0.376 0.491 
CEO abnormal compensation  -0.053 0.072  -0.050 0.079  -0.050 0.088  -0.044 0.140  -0.042 0.149 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.069 0.069  0.083 0.040  0.075 0.055  0.090 0.024  0.107 0.012 
 
N  719   719  719   693   693  
Pseudo R2  0.229   0.244  0.245   0.235   0.261  
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TABLE 9 
Cutting R&D and future firm performance  
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of a firm’s performance in the future on its determinants. 
The regression is estimated using 2,017 firm-years from S&P 500 firms over the period 1995-2008 with 
required data. The dependent variable is the average industry-adjusted ROA or CFO in the next three 
years. ROA is return on assets and CFO is cash flows from operations scaled by lagged assets. D_SD is an 
indicator for the small earnings decrease (SD) group. RD_Decrease_SD is an indicator for firms in the SD 
group that cut R&D; it is 1 if the firm is in the SD group and cuts R&D compared with the prior year and 
0 otherwise. RD_Decrease_Others is an indicator for firms in the other groups (including the large 
earnings decrease (LD) group and the earnings increase (IN) group) that cut R&D; it is 1 if the firm is in 
the other groups and cuts R&D compared with the prior year and 0 otherwise. The other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. 
The p-values are one-sided for RD_Decrease_SD and two-sided otherwise. 
 
 Future ROA  Future CFO 
 Coef. P-value  Coef. P-value 
Intercept  -0.079 0.003  -0.079 0.000 
D_SD  -0.007 0.213  0.001 0.831 
RD_Decrease_SD  -0.007 0.017  -0.018 0.002 
RD_Decrease_Others  0.005 0.269  0.003 0.418 
Tobin’s Q  0.005 0.027  0.009 0.001 
Change in capital expenditures  -0.019 0.003  -0.014 0.001 
Change in sales  0.023 0.001  0.010 0.021 
Firm size  0.006 0.009  0.003 0.102 
Leverage  -0.032 0.103  -0.014 0.362 
Institutional ownership  0.016 0.193  0.028 0.033 
ROA  0.268 0.001    
CFO     0.238 0.001 
 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes  
N  2,017   2,017  
Adjusted R2  0.264   0.337  
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TABLE 10  
CEO contractual protection and CEO turnovers 
 
This table reports the results from the following probit regressions: 
εVariablesControltionCEO_Protecα
tionCEO_ProtecePerformancαePerformancαα1)TurnoverPr(CEO 10 
 β3
2  
The sample includes 3,715 firm-years from S&P 500 firms over the period 1995-2008. The sample size is 
larger than in the main analyses because we do not need to require that the firm-years have significant 
R&D and the list of control variables is different. CEO_Turnover is 1 for firm-years with CEO turnover 
in the next year and 0 otherwise. Performance is annual market-adjusted stock returns or industry-
adjusted return on assets. CEO_Protection is an indicator for CEO contractual protection; it is 1 if the 
CEO has an employment agreement or a severance pay agreement and 0 otherwise. The control variables 
include the following: CEO_Ownership is the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO; 
CEO_Age_Year is CEO’s age in years; CEO_Tenure is the number of years the CEO has been at the 
current position; Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets (in millions); Herfindahl_Index is the sum 
of the squared market share (based on sales) of all the firms in the industry; Blockholder is an indicator 
for outside blockholder ownership being higher than the sample median; and CEO_Chair_Duality is an 
indicator variable for cases where the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors. All the 
explanatory variables are measured in the year before CEO turnover is measured. The p-values are based 
on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. The p-values are one-sided for Performance and 
its interaction with CEO_Protection and two-sided otherwise. The marginal effect is calculated as the 
change in the probability of CEO turnover, when there is a change of one standard deviation in the 
continuous explanatory variables (or a change from 0 to 1 in the indicator variables), with other 
explanatory variables taking the value of the sample means. The calculation of the marginal effect for the 
interaction terms follows Norton et al. (2004). 
 
 Performance = stock return  Performance = ROA 
 Coef. 
P-
value 
Marginal 
effect  Coef. 
P-
value 
Marginal 
effect 
Intercept -8.018 0.001   -8.038 0.001  
Performance -0.955 0.001 -0.080  -0.301 0.001 -0.027 
Performance  CEO_Protection 0.756 0.005 0.084  0.289 0.001 0.026 
CEO_Protection -0.224 0.030 -0.020  -0.224 0.065 -0.019 
CEO_Ownership -0.063 0.079 -0.016  -0.070 0.061 -0.017 
CEO_Age_Year 0.111 0.001 0.061  0.111 0.001 0.059 
CEO_Tenure 0.004 0.602 0.003  0.002 0.763 0.001 
Assets -0.027 0.489 -0.003  -0.020 0.597 -0.002 
Herfindahl_Index -0.217 0.544 -0.003  -0.216 0.547 -0.002 
Blockholder 0.056 0.645 0.005  0.089 0.485 0.007 
CEO_Chair_Duality 0.071 0.634 0.006  0.055 0.675 0.004 
 
N 3,715    3,715   
Pseudo R2 0.072    0.070   
 
